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This thesis demonstrates the improvements in computational
efficiency, expandability, flexibility and cost that can be
achieved in the solution of the Ocean Surveillance problem
by the use of recently introduced technology. A preliminary
design of the surveillance portion of a conceptual model of
a fault tolerant distributed Command, Control and Communica-
tions system is carried out. The proposed system consists
of a long haul fiber-optic ring network. Each one of its
nodes has a similar multicomputer architecture for the manip-
ulation of data collected by a variety of detection sensors.
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Any Command, Control and Communications (C5) system must
be able to successfully perform the following basic functions:
1. Detection of targets within its surveillance area
limits by means of various search sensors. These sensors
may be mounted on mobile or fixed platforms.
2. Tracking of targets, as long as they remain within
the geographical area of interest. This is achieved by the
use of fixed or mobile tracking systems.
5. Classification of targets after detection by means
of identification devices and/or association of present to
previously obtained information.
4. Display positional information considering all targets
within the surveillance area limits onto plots and/or large
screen displays.
5. Storing tactical information into data bases for use
in the near or more distant future.
6. Control of weapon and support systems, to attack the
target(s) after permission has been granted. This is accom-
plished by providing target behaviour parameters to the Fire
Control Systems (FCS) and the various defensive systems such
as Electronic Support Measures (ESM) , Electronic Counter-
measures (ECM) , decoys, etc.
15

The difficulty of accomplishing the above functions
varies significantly depending on:
a. The technological advance in each of the referred
application areas.
b. The effectiveness of human interaction with the
system (training, motivation and emotional factors).
Today's trend is to replace the functions formerly per-
formed by humans with computer controlled functions, up to
the point of leaving to the humans only the ultimate decision
making function, and the option to override the system
(authorized personnel)
.
All functions of the C3 systems have undergone develop-
ment over the last twenty years and many computer applications
have been successful. For instance, a computer can automati-
cally "read" information directly from the radar receiver,
make the conversion of its coordinates (polar to Cartesian)
,
plot, track, store the information into a database and, if
desired, feed data to a weapons control system to enable it
to destroy the target.
A surveillance system acts as part of a C5 system which
handles the functions of detection, tracking, classification
and information storing [Ref. 1]. Detection of an object
should always result in alerting the decision maker. This
can be done through means of information display. Figure
1-1 illustrates how a surveillance system fits in the process













Figure 1-1. Chronological Sequence of
Event Handling in C5
After the Commander has been alerted, a decision on the
appropriate reaction to the threat is made. This function
can be accomplished either as a pure human aided decision or
as an automated response process (Aegis system)
.
Communications will ensure that the above decision is
transmitted and received in such a way that delays are mini-
mized and message context is highly reliable. This way the
orders will be received ''in time" and the decided response
will be initiated.
Finally, the Commander should be equipped with mechanisms
and procedures enabling him to control the correci execution
of the issued orders. These procedures reflect the second
element of the C5 triad, namely the "control".

B. PURPOSE OF THESIS
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the use of the
recently developed Large Scale Integrated (LSI) circuit tech-
nology, the fiber-optic communications technology and some
newly developed operating systems concepts in order to build
a Command, Control and Communications (C5) system. The thesis
offers a preliminary design of the surveillance portion of
such a C3 system which is based on a distributed local net-
work concepts and which contains processing nodes of the
network built from multi -microcomputer systems. The network
nodes are tied together with a fiber-optic double ring struc-
ture which permits single failures of either a link or a
computational node without causing system's failure. The
network nodes consist of a multiprocessor system of single
board computers (SBC) sharing common memory for shared data.
The operating system of each network node is distributed
among the SBC's in the node and the operating system of the
network is an extension of the operating system at each
network node.
The advantages such a system offers are:
1. Failure tolerance at both the network and node levels.
2. Computation load balancing .
5. Expandabi li ty at both the network and node levels.
4. Low hardware cost .
5. High system capacity .
6. Increased survivability (through decentralization).
16

On the other hand, the price that has to be paid is
expressed in the following drawbacks:
7. The proposed architecture is untried (high risk).
8. The operating system becomes more complex as a result
of the implementation of data and process distribution
(in contrast to the ones used in centralized systems)
.
To demonstrate how the above concepts can be implemented,
a simplified model of a Tactical Surveillance System will be
described. The design of the system will be applicable to
most geographical environments and will be based on some
ideas expressed in the open literature on surveillance sys-
tems plus the author's 21 years of experience in Naval Tactics
C. C3 SYSTEMS
Some of the existing Command, Control and Communications
(C5) systems will be overviewed in this section. Most of
these systems are operational today. Since they belong to
different generations, they will be described in a chronolog-
ical order. They, in some respect, reflect the state-of-the-
art in both hardware and software during the time period
they were designed.
As an aggregate Naval system, C3 touches on a number of
related functions such as intelligence, surveillance, navi-
gation and logistics. A C5 system must provide the means
whereby military decision makers have access to the informa-
tion that these other functions provide. So, most of the
C3 systems which are in operation today are tightly or loosely
17

linked with systems dedicated to one or more of these
related functions.
Going back to the mid 50' s, the three services of the
U.S. Armed Forces were greatly concerned with the threat
from high speed aerial attacks. They contracted with the
University of Illinois Control System Laboratory to explore
the use of digital computers for the rapid solution of the
air defense problem using information received and correlated
from a network of search radars [Ref. 3]. The growing threat
to forces afloat and ashore, coupled with the diminishing
time available to react, spurred the investigation of computer
assistance for C3 from World War II on. Up to then, various
attempts to adapt the technology of analog computers had
unsatisfactory results. The systems were complex, limited
in capacity and had little potential for growth. The new
era gave rise to some successful C3 systems.
1 . Semi -Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) System
It was designed by IBM for the Air Force and is still
operational. It consists of a network of air search radars
all over northern U.S. and Canada.
The central computer of the system has data on posi-
tions of both friendly and enemy aircraft (weapons, inter-
ceptors, readiness, fuel, etc.) so as to keep a continuous




2. Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS)
It was developed in the late 50' s to early 60 's
period. It operates in the Task Force environment but each
ship has a suite of equipment that can function as a self-
sufficient system. One of the biggest obstacles of the system
in building networks for the exchange of target information
is the limited memory capacity of the computers used. The
system's major components are:
a. Analog to Digital (A/D) Converters
They convert analog sensor data into digital
information in order to be entered into the computer.
b. Computing Equipment
A multicomputer installation is used because of
the limitations on core size and the need to store everything
in memory (programs, data, and messages). Univac computers
are used.
c. Communications Equipment
All elements of a Task Force or several Task
Forces are able to exchange information rapidly over high-
speed data links (high level of data integration)
.
d. Visual Displays
There exist display consoles for detecting,
tracking, identifying, evaluating and assigning weapons for
intercept control.
Both hardware and software (build in modules)
have gone through a series of improvements which shortened
19

response times by sharply reducing the human role in data
processing and presentation.
3. Airborne Tactical Data System (ATDS)
The development of transistorized computers small
enough to fit in airplanes, permitted the development of the
ATDS. Its purpose is to provide an independent, self con-
tained detection, identification, tracking and air controlled
intercept capability for the picket aircraft. The system
interfaces with the NTDS. Its sensor is a search radar.
The data processing and display functions are per-
formed by a computer which embeds two processors that share
the program functions, and three cathode ray tube display
units for the crew. The computer processes track data,
either for transmission to the NTDS or to be used for the
control of interceptors. All computer programs are modularly
built and divided into several classes and subclasses which
are handled by one or both processors of the computer.
In both NTDS and ATDS, as in all equivalent C5 sys-
tems of this generation, the greatest concerns have been:
hardware reliability, memory size limitations, system inter-
facing and maintainability [Ref. 4]. The centralized
processing concept was popular, since only a major computer
installation made the operational and maintenance functions
economically and technically feasible (specialized personnel,





The computers used in these systems reflect the
architecture and technology of the 60' s and are difficult to
be integrated into a larger system. On the other hand, the
substitution of analog with digital computers has increased
the performance of these C5 systems.
To form the database for these systems, data from
many other systems are utilized. These other systems are
designed for their own specific purposes and a lot of changes
had to be made for data to be interchangeable.
From the software point of view, data are manipulated
sequentially since it was assumed that the method of their
arrival is sequential too [Ref. 5].
In general, it can be stated that SAGE, NTDS and
ATDS systems are basically manual systems, strongly assisted
by computers [Ref. 6].
4 . Ocean Surveillance Information (OSIS) System
It is a world-wide network of facilities and analysts
that provides comprehensive information on everything of
interest which lies on, over and under the sea. It uses a
digital network to gather, correlate and disseminate informa-
tion, primarily for strategic headquarters commanders. The
system was designed in the late 60's. Contact data classi-
fication and identification is sped up by the use of heuristic





Similar to the OSIS system, it is still under test
on a number of Navy vehicles and selected shore stations.
6 Octopus Tracking System
It is an experimental passive sonar tracking system.
7 Intelligence Tracking and Correlation (ITAC) System
The system operates within a surveillance data base
which maintains separate track files for each sensor that
provides data. The system is still in the testing phase.
The above constitute a later generation of C3 systems
Their detailed architecture is unknown to the author because
of their classification level. What is known is that they
all use large or mini computers as processing devices and
distributed processing is probably not used in any one of
them. As for the software, all information is covered under
the classifications "SECRET" or "CONFIDENTIAL".
8
.
Aegis Combat System (ACS)
It is a sophisticated antimissile and antiair C3
system which is being installed onboard several ships of the
U.S. Navy. The system in its present version contains 15
AN/UYK-7 and 24 AN/UYK-20 mini computers. These computers
can operate as cooperating independent units or in groups
of up to 4 AN/UYK-7 processors in a multiprocessor system.
Each computer system is dedicated to a major function such
as processing sensor information, controlling the radar, or
coordinating the weapons systems. The total hardware cost

of these computers is about $5,000,000. Timely control of
an Aegis ship's missile fire-power during a multi-axis sur-
prise attack does not always leave room for positive human
control [Ref. 7]. Therefore, Aegis has a pre-selected oper-
ating mode in which the system itself makes the tactical
decision to engage, based on given threat criteria.
9 . Navy Command and Control System (NCCS)
It is a loose confederation of relatively autonomous
command and control nodes. Its development was started in
the mid-70s and it is scheduled to perform as a response
but flexible system subordinating the goals of individual
components to those of a larger organization (nationwide)
.
It attempts to take full advantage of sophisticated systems
that already exist within the U.S. Navy command structure.
The nodes of the system correspond to command posts ashore
and afloat. The new nodes differ from those they are replac-
ing primarily in terms of their processing capacity and the
speed and clarity of their data presentations. The system
is still under development.
It is apparent that the U.S. Navy is still using
computers that reflect the architecture and the technology
of the 60' s which are difficult to use as components in
larger systems. The inter-connections between the subsystems
are achieved by ad hoc cabling between these computers which
must share information. On the other hand, automated naval
C5 is becoming a reality despite problems of reliability

and efficiency that still appear from time to time. Auto-
mation has become more and more routine for military tasks,
and reliability has improved as operators and users accustom
themselves to the new systems.
As expressed in Chapter 9 of [Ref. 7], future C3
systems will take advantage of Large Scale Integration (LSI)
,
multicomputer systems (instead of central large computers)
and processing distribution architectures. Future systems
will also be potentially less expensive in hardware costs
than the existing ones.'&
D. DISTRIBUTED MICROCOMPUTER SYSTEMS (REVIEW)
In general, military Command, Control and Communications
systems of today fall in the category of large-scale distrib-
uted, event driven systems (from the operational point of
view). The problem of C3 system design is one of optimizing,
on a system's wide basis, the aggregation of data coming
from geographically distributed sensors and decision makers
subject to limits on communications and computation [Ref.
42]. Since the various decision makers (users) have disparate
information needs and practical considerations make it im-
possible to supply the global information set to each user,
the desirable architecture is one that includes sensor,
processor and communications resources that provide each
user just the information needed at just the right time.
There does not yet exist a unique definition for a
distributed system. However, viewing the centralized system
24

(all functions are controlled by a central computer) on one
hand, and the decentralized system on the other (functions are
performed by individual processors with no coordination)
,
distributed systems can be placed somewhere in between. In
other words, they can be defined as decentralized systems
where process coordination can be applied. Their main
characteristics are:
1. Modular and extensible architecture.
2. Arbitrary number of system and user processes.
5. Communication is by message passing or shared memory .
4. There exists a system control supporting interprocess
cooperation and runtime management .
5. Interprocess messages have non- zero , variable and
sometimes unpredictable delays.
Applications where the implementation of distributed
systems is recommended are these in which there already
exists a geographical dispersion. In this case the distrib-
uted systems allow for fast exchange of data among the nodes,
balancing of processing load, increased system survivability
and great flexibility in computation.
A carefully designed distributed system reflects an
almost failure proof processing/data-storing potential, com-
bining most of the advantages of centralized and decentralized
systems
.
The greatest concern in distributed systems involves
communications. Modern hardware/software state-of-the-art
has made it possible to overcome most of the previously
25

existing communications obstacles. Much research is done
today towards the improvement of the performance of distributed
systems; however, many problems, including the problem of
centralized or decentralized controls, remain unresolved.
There are various kinds of networking architectures
which can be used in distributed systems. Figure 1-2 shows
the most common ones.
HYPERCUBE
Figure 1-2 Examples of Connection Topologies
for Multipath Networks.

No working distributed C3 system is currently in opera-
tion. However, there exist some banking, airline reservation
and computer network systems (ARPANET, DECNET, etc.) which
are distributed. Some more are currently going through their
experimental phase and others are under development. The
above facts necessitate a more or less theoretical or a
heuristic approach to the problem of finding the most appro-
priate network architecture for a C3 system.
In general, distributed network architectures can be
divided into local and long-haul ones. Because of the recent
advances in fiber-optic technology, it is likely that some
local network architectures can be used in systems where
the nodes are dispersed in wide areas (several thousands of
square iles) .
The factors which are considered in choosing one of the
above architectures are performance, communications and data
transfer costs, communications delay, expandibility and file
availability
.
Performance can be further analyzed into data throughput
on the network and response time. It maybe is the most
important consideration in the design of real-time systems.
From the above network architectures, the one that offers
the higher throughput and fastest responsiveness, is the
fully connected one since each one of the nodes is directly
connected to all the others. Second to the fully connected,
the ring and hypercube architectures have good performance
characteristics. The rest of the architectures are inferior.
27

Considering the communications cost for the "star",
"ring", "completely connected", "tree", and the "hypercube"
networks, it appears that the ring network is more economical
in terms of communications lines and interface units cost
[Refs. 44, 45].
In terms of data storage cost the differences between
all of the networks shown in Figure 1-2 are not significant.
The star topology seems to be more convenient and economical
if a simple duplication of data storage is chosen.
Communications delay varies a lot between these archi-
tectures. A fully connected network minimizes delays. The
use of fiber optics can reduce communications delays since
the velocity of data transmission is practically equal to
the speed of light. The other aspect of communications delay
is how long should some data have to wait in a queue to
succeed in accessing a (shared) communications means (e.g.
a bus)
.
The ring network is much superior to all the others in
terms of expandibility since very few changes are required
to be made (in software and in the hardware) whenever a new
mode is added to the network.
The file availability in the star network architecture
is the worst because of the long queues that can be formed
in the ports of a central global database (which is normally




E. PROPOSED C3 SYSTEM'S CONCEPTUAL MODEL
The Command, Control and Communications (C3) system which
is described in this thesis has the following general
characteristics
:
1. There exists a geographical ocean area of approxi-
mately 400,000 square Km, which has a number of islands and
islets spread within its limits and is constantly under
surveillance by a number of fixed radars.
2. Command and Control activities are distributed among
four Subarea Commands, each one of which controls an almost
equal size subarea.
3. All subarea control centers are tied together on a
distributed fiber-optic ring netxvork permitting the full or
partial integration of the tactical information handled in
the local subarea environments.
4. In every subarea there exists a local radar surveil-
lance network. Data sensed by these radars are transmitted
to a common physical site, where a complex of processors is
used for the correlation of target data.
5. An identical hierarchy of software modules exists
in every subarea processing site. These modules serve a
standard process package and update a local database holding
data that have to do with the subarea tactical environment
only.
6. A global database (two or more copies) exists in
one or more area sites. This database includes data concerning
29

all individual subareas as well as historical and "library"
data.
7. Through special message passing it is possible that
C3 coordination for two or more nodes be exercised by one
of them. This becomes necessary whenever the geographical
extent of the operation in progress exceeds the limits of an
individual Subarea or when a Subarea Command is unable to











Figure 1-5 Inter-Node Network
and Subarea Network

8. A variety of failure tolerance mechanisms (hardware
and software) have been designed into the proposed system.
These are the duplication of the fiber-optic ring cable, the
existence of alternate sensor/weapons systems connections to
other subarea nodes, the duplication of the global database,
the load sharing mechanisms between the processors of each
multicomputer node, etc. All of them contribute to reducing
the possibility of an occurrence of a fatal failure in the
system.
Figure 1-3 gives an illustration of the system's archi-
tecture in general.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The thesis is composed of six chapters.
Following the introduction, Chapter II discusses the
architecture of the conceptual model of the C3 system. A
system's overview is given presenting the organization of
the distributed internode network, the structure of the multi
computer nodes and the fiber-optic ring interface network.
A more detailed description of sensor interconnection to
the network (through the computational nodes) is given. The
description of the architecture of the multicomputer nodes
and the fiber-optic ring interface are given in the last part
of this chapter.
Chapter III deals with the C3 system's conceptual data
organization (for the surveillance portion only. It includes

the identification of the conceptual data and their rela-
tionships, the description of the storage model and the
organization of the "global" and "local" databases as well as
the mechanisms used for information sharing among them. The
flow of data in the network and the mechanisms supporting
fault tolerance for the cases of failed network components
are separately examined.
Chapter IV is dedicated to the organization of data and
processes within the individual multicomputer nodes of the
network (subarea level) . This organization covers both the
processing and operational requirements. It describes how
the report-to-report, report - to -track and track- to- track
correlation problems are handled. Track identification and
the existing means for the human interface with the system
are presented in separate sections. Finally the fault-tolerance
of the multicomputer node is discussed.
In Chapter V a performance prediction and evaluation is
attempted. Possible bottlenecks in system's operation are
identified and the side effects which may be caused by ex-
panding it are pointed out. In the last section of this
chapter a comparison of this conceptual model system to
existing C3/surveillance ones is done.
The final chapter is dedicated to conclusions on the
extent of the research performed during the development of
this thesis and recommendations for further work are expressed
in relation to the goals set in Chapter I.
32

Appendix "A" includes illustrations of the conceptual





This chapter is dedicated to the description of the
architecture of the conceptual model of the Command, Control
and Communications (C3) system. This model system uses as a
physical background a geographical area covering ocean sur-
face of approximately 400,000 sq. Km. The area includes a
number of islands spread almost equidensely. From the com-
mand point of view, this area is partitioned into four
subareas (SI to S4) . Each of these subareas has a physical,
fixed command post from where the C5 functions for the sub-
area are exercised. A number of sensors and weapons systems
(both fixed) exists within the limits of each subarea. Area
topology and subarea relative arrangement is shown in Figure
II-l.
Real-time performance is another background consideration
for this as for most of the C5 systems. The speed and de-
structiveness of modern weapons systems do not permit delays,
while decision-makers organize their subordinates and get in
touch with the proper superiors. To affect the outcome of
an operation, "real-time" command decisions must correspond
to the rapidly developing conflict situation. The command
and control "nodes" (subarea command posts) that support key
decision-makers must maintain efficient and, when necessary,
54

secure communications with other nodes in the chain of com-
mand. They must organize and access a large amount of data
on the operating forces and their environment (sensors/Weapons)
,








Figure II-l. System's Topology
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1 . Network Organization
The four subarea command posts constitute the nodes
of a fixed, double ring, distributed network. The physical
channels used for internode message passing are cables of
fiber-optic material which for almost all of its length is
placed under water. One of the physical channels of the
double ring is called "primary" and is the message traffic
carrier under normal network operation. The other channel
is called "standby" and is used whenever either the primary
channel or a node fails. Primary and standby channels follow
a different path from node to node for physical security
reasons. The direction of internode message flow is uni-
directional under normal network operation.
Each one of the nodes has its own, almost equal,
processing power (hardware and software) so as to exercise
all C5 functions. A great number (50 to 50) of Single Board
Computers (SBC) of equal capabilities make up the workshop
used for the execution of a family of processes accomplish-
ing the C3 functions. Each node has its own local memory
which holds all data necessary for the conduct of the C5
functions within the host subarea. Local memory is stored
on hard disks and is shared among the various processes at
the multicomputer node level.
In the network there also exists a so called Global
Data Base (GDB) which is the internode shared memory. Two
copies of the GDB exist. They are hosted in the physical
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installations of every second multicomputer node. Each of
the GDB copies is directly connected to the ring network and
has its own computer based Data Base Management System (DBMS)
[Refs. 8,9]. These DBMSs can be viewed as two extra nodes
connected to the network. One of the subarea nodes acts as
a "primary node" at any given time. This node is the one
where the senior commander, responsible for C3 in the whole
area covered by the system, happens to be (he can be in any
one of the subarea command posts since they all have the
same structure and potential) . The internode network arrange


















Figure II -2. Network Layout
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Message passing between the nodes occurs whenever
coordination of C3 functions in two or more subareas is
required, whenever the GDB is accessed or whenever messages
concerning the operation of the network itself are exchanged




The C5 system has both active and passive sensors.
These sensors provide the means by which "reports" are sensed
and fed into the system. They are radars, electromagnetic
emission detectors, underwater sonics , and optical devices.
To perform its response functions, the system con-
trols anti-air (AA) , anti-submarine (AS) as well as anti-
surface (ASu) weapons and electronic/acoustical countermeasures
Each one of the above sensors is directly connected
to a node of the network which covers the C3 needs of the
subarea the sensor is in. This way, four local networks of
sensors and weapons systems are formed (one per subarea)
.
In addition to these direct connections for each sensor/
weapons system, there exists a secondary connection to another
node (the closest). The secondary connections may be acti-
vated whenever the "parent" node fails. Figure II -5 illus-
trates how these connections are conceptualized.
3 Multicomputer Nodes
A multicomputer complex is physically located in
every subarea command post. Thirty to fifty SBCs are inter-










Figure II-3. Connection of Sensors/Weapons
to the Network.
shared memory complex and various I/O units. The multi-
processor architecture has the characteristics of a time
shared/common bus, shared memory. This architecture is
based on the connection of all processing, memory and I/O
units to a shared bus. Contention resolving for the use
of the bus by the above units is fulfilled by a first-in
first-out (FIFO) queue scheme. The most serious limitations
of this organization are its reliability and the interfer-
ence between units requesting the bus [Ref. 10: pp. 25-26].
To reduce contention of the various processors for
the bus, private memory (RAM) and private I/O are used for
the greatest possible extent. Another feature of this

application is the duplication of the bus, so a failure of
this common path will not cause complete system failure.
The use of the bus is limited to cross talk between processor
complexes, shared memory accesses and I/O to the ring.
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Figure II-4. Internal Multiprocessor Node
Architecture
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4 . Fiber-Optic Ring Interface Network
The rate of data transmission through the fiber-optic
communications channel is lOMbits/sec, which is the maximum
practical rate at which the interface units of the individual
nodes can operate (technology of today imposes this limit)
.
The 1.3 ^yw fiber-optic cable configuration is used. This
fiber suffers less than ldb/klm signal strength loss [Ref.
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16]. Repeaters are placed approximately every 20 Kms [Ref.
11] and are powered through electricity cables running paral-
lel to the fiber-optic cable (inside the same coating). A
detailed description of the technical parameters of the
fiber-optic channel and the interface units used in the nodes
to access it, is given in Section D of this chapter.
The advantages offered by the use of commercially
available fiber-optics in communications channels over the
existing coaxial and copper ones are:
a. Ability to provide extremely high data rates over
long distances.
b. Lower cost of cable per kilometer (including repeater/
amplifier cost). This cost is presently $0,046 per
fiber meter (minimum) [Ref. 17].
-9
c. Extremely low bit error rate (less than 10 ).
d. Immunity to electrical noise, shocks and to water.
e. Low cross-talk between adjacent cables.
f. Tolerance to temperature changes (from -12° C up to
150° C) . However, in underwater installations temper-
ature varies only between 5° C and 2G° C [Ref. 18].
g. Light weight, low volume.
h. High resistance to corrosion.
i. Efforts to intercept the channel are immediately
detectable .
The above characteristics make the use of fiber-optic
cable favorable for use in the internode ring network as
communications channel because of the real-time/security/
reliability requirements of the C5 system.
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Fiber-optic's main disadvantages are the nonexistence
of standards (affecting system's cost and parts availability)
its low resistance to radiation damage, and the difficulty
to make new connections of nodes on the cable (splicing the
cable causes substantial strength losses) . Specifically for
the radiation damage, long term/low dose or high dose irrad-
iation is causing luminescence followed by attenuation,
increased dispersion and mechanical damage. These effects
can be either temporary or permanent depending upon the fiber
material (commercially available glass fibers are more sus-
ceptible, while germanium doped fused silica fibers appear
to be the most radiation resistant [Refs. 11 and 14]. This
second disadvantage of fibers is reduced by the use of under-
water cable installations [Ref. 11].
B. SENSORS
The sensors of the Command and Control system are perhaps
its most fundamental elements. In order that system's oper-
ation be triggered, one of the sensors has to be stimulated.
By viewing the so called Rona's Canonical general model
of a Command and Control system (Figure II-5), it becomes
obvious that the I/O ports through which it communicates
with the environment are the sensors (stimulus set) and the
weapons systems (effect set) .
Since the weapons systems are less standardized, from


















. - ^MISSION OBJECTIVES
Figure 1 1 - 5 . Rona's Canonical Model.
[Ref ]
a detailed description of their interconnection to the C3
system. On the other hand, sensor's interconnection to the
network will be discussed in detail.
Sensors can be considered as sources of information.
However, sensors which are used exclusively for weapon con-
trol will not be considered in this section. Sensors can be
categorized into the following types [Ref. 12]:
a. Continuous -valued data sensors: These are radars,
sonars (both passive and active) and other tracking
devices
.
b. Discrete -valued data sensors: In this category,
the visual detection and electromagnetic emission
interception sensors can be included. Special
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identification of friend or foe (IFF) equipment is
also a discrete- valued data sensor.
Most of the sensors work in a periodic fashion. This
period is called "scan" and it denotes the time it takes to
revisit the same point in their search covered space. For
instance, in the case of a radar, if it takes 6 seconds for
the antenna to pass twice from a point on bearing "X", its
period will be 6 seconds. The operation of the nonscanning
sensors (e.g. nondirectional hydrophones) can be referred to
the scan period of a scanning sensor. This way, if an event
is sensed by a nonscanning sensor at time T + AT (in reference
to the scan period of a scanning sensor) , it is said that
has occurred during scan period T+l.
The case becomes more complicated when there exist mul-
tiple scanning sensors with unequal scan periods where a
lot of transformations have to be made. This added overhead
slows down system's operation.
1 . Subarea Physical Sensor Coverage
In each one of the subareas , the whole surface and
the corresponding subsurface/air volume is covered by every
one of the sensor systems applicable. For instance, a surface
or air radar network should not leave any gaps (also for
hydrophone, ESM, optical, etc. networks). In Figure 1 1 - 6
a typical subarea conceptual radar network is shown.
Considering this radar network, the following char-
acteristics can be observed. These also constitute the





Figure II -6. Subarea Radar Network Coverage
a. It does not leave coverage gaps.
b. It provides at least two zones of detection in terms
of depth of defense (from either direction).
c. Some radar detection sectors are overlapping over the
same region (at most three overlapping radar sectors)
d. Individual radar maximum detection ranges may differ.
e. A common cartesian coordinate system exists, which
covers the whole C3 area. In Figure II -6 only a
portion of the coordinate system is shown.
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f. Another requirement, which is set in order to facili-
tate the report correlation process, is for all radars
of a subarea to have the same scan period. Chapter
IV gets into the reasoning of this decision in greater
detail
.
2 . Sensor Interconnection to the Network
Next to each sensor (e.g. radar installation) there
exists a local video monitor site. In addition, all the
sensors are directly (point-to-point) connected to the multi-
processor nodes. These connections are through special
interface I/O modules located at the same site. The main
function of the interface modules is to convert the analog
information coming from the individual sensors into digital
signals. They also perform other conversions, such as they
convert reports expressed in polar coordinates into cartesian
(global grid) ones.
Although the cabling of the sensors to the multi-
processor nodes does not need to be of any special material,
the use of fiber-optics would reduce both the data contamina-
tion and the communications delay.
Sensors are sited into fixed physical locations (land
or seabed) . Some of them are mobile (on vehicles) and can
be moved to preselected alternate locations. These alternate
locations are close to the normal ones so that when they are
used the sensors/weapons coverage is not affected. The
coordinates of these locations are known to the interface
modules so that the conversion of the report parameters into
the common cartesian grid is performed locally.
46

In both normal and alternate locations, cabling and
power supplies already exist. The reason alternate locations
have been introduced is physical security of the sensors
during tension or wartime periods.
Another provision which increases the survivability
of the system is the connection of all sensors, as well as
weapons systems to a second multiprocessor node. This way,
their control can be switched to this take-over node when-
ever either the node that normally controls them fails or
it becomes overloaded. This reduces the possibility of gap
occurrences on the surveillance coverage of the C5 system.
Figure 1 1 - 7 illustrates a typical sensor's connection to the
network
.
Reports, before leaving a sensor site, in order to
be transmitted to a multiprocessor node's I/O module, go
through the modules of the interface unit.
The operation of this interface unit is controlled
by a single board computer (SBC) . This computer has a copy
of the global clock that is synchronized periodically by the
control module of the multiprocessor node the sensor is
attached to.
a. Analog to Digital (A/D) Converter
It converts the analog report signal as it comes





























Figure II-7. Sensor Connection to Network.
b. Polar to Cartesian
This unit takes as inputs the digitized reports
and the digitally expressed coordinates of the detection
sensor's location (normal or alternate) and converts them
into cartesian in reference to the global coordinate system.
c. Scan Report Buffer
All report coordinates are loaded into a buffer
after the global time component is added to them, in a sequen
tial fashion. The global clock of the system causes the
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transmission of the contents of this buffer to the multi-
processor node every "T" seconds, where "T" is the duration
of a scan period of the sensor.
C. MULTICOMPUTER NODES
Every one of the multiprocessor nodes has its own comput-
ing and data storage potential. In this way, it is able to
fulfill all C3 functions within the subarea it serves. Node
independence is achieved through the distribution of the
processes necessary for data manipulation. Since any one of
the multiprocessor nodes may be called to take over the con-
trol of sensors lying in its neighboring subarea(s), processes
for handling data of all kinds of sensors/weapons systems
are distributed there (even if their host subarea does not
contain these sensors)
.
In each one of the multiprocessor nodes there exists a
module complex which controls the operation of the other
mocule complexes and also synchronizes the node's operation
with the other nodes on the network.
Each sensor/weapon system's group has its own dedicated
module complex. All interfacing and data association func-
tions for the group is performed within this module complex.
Additional module complexes are dedicated to the cross-
correlation of data coming from more than one sensor/weapons
system's module complexes (e.g. radar/sonar data correlation).
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A so called shared local memory holds all information on
enemy, friendly and neutral activity within the subarea,
plus information of global concern to the system.
The arrangement of the module groups of a multiprocessor
node is illustrated in Figure II-8.
RADAR COMPLEX SONAR COMPLEX ESM COMPLEX
CONTROL COMPLEX RADAR/ESM RADAR/SONAR SHARED
CORRELATION CORRELATION MEMORY
Figure II-8. Multiprocessor Module Group Arrangement
One of the I/O modules of the node is used for internode
communication (fiber-optic interface) and the other to
interface with the users in the node environment ('consoles,
switches, displays, etc.).
The bus which links all the module complexes is a paral-




Single Board Computers (SBC)
A great variety of commercially available SBCs can
be used as processors to perform the functions of the modules
of the multiprocessor node's complex. An example is Intel's
iSBC 86/12, which is low priced ($2000.00 approximately) and
offers a flexible architecture. These features make it a
very attractive choice for use in the modules of the C3
system.
The iSBC 86/12A is a complete computer system imple-
mented on a single printed circuit board. It has resident
a CPU, read/write memory, read only memory, I/O ports and
drivers, serial communications interface, interval timer,
interrupt controller, and bus control logic and drivers.
The central processor for the system is the 8086A 16 bit
microprocessor (made by Intel)
.
These iSBCs can be connected to a common bus in great
numbers (10 to 20). They all have their private memory (64K
of 16 bit words read/write) , while they can access a shared
RAM memory of 1M connected to the shared bus. Various com-
binations of sharing parts or the whole of this memory can
be achieved.
2 System's Bus
Within each one of the sensor/weapons sytem's mocule
group a number of iSBCs is connected to a parallel bus which
has an attached shared memorv unit.
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As an example, the "Radar Network's Module Group"
is as in Figure II-9.
Figure II -9. Radar Module Complex.
Every module group is connected through a common
"bus switch" to the parallel multiprocessor node's bus.
This switch regulates the I/O traffic to the bus and switches
to the standby bus whenever the primary fails (receiving
instructions from a Scheduler module)
.
For each radar for the subarea and for the radars
of the neighboring subareas which are alternatively controlled
by the multiprocessor node, there exists a SBC. It receives
the digitized signal as it comes from the interface unit
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through the fiber-optic cable. To switch from the primary
to the alternative sensor site line, it has a single switch-
ing mechanism which selects one of two existing I/O ports.
Input consists of radar contacts (report/time records) as
they are described in Section "B" of this chapter. Their
output to the processor module (P) are records representing
radar contact reports (cartesian coordinates and real time
in hours, minutes and seconds).
The processors (P) are used to execute certain cor-
relation processes. These processors are iSBCs 80/86.
Since there is always a possibility that a certain
radar's sector is overloaded with contacts (scan report buffer
overflow) , there exists a mechanism to route excessive reports
to a standby processor.
The unloading of the scan report buffers of all the
interface units of the radars is synchronized by the module
complex controlling processor (PC) . This processor sends
clock synchronization messages to the radar interface units
every five scan periods. It also sends to all the iSBCs of
the group a special signal every "T" seconds (scan period)
.
This causes them to start a new surveillance cycle (it is
implied that all radars of the radar network must have the
same scan period)
.
The shared memory of the radar module complex holds
all active track data in record form. It also holds information
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on the utilization of the bus and the protocols used for
dialogs among the different module complexes.
The control processor is a dedicated one. It is
used to synchronize the operation of the whole complex by
operating event-counts based on the scan period of the radars
It also controls the bus switch module (in/out) whenever
there is information to be routed to another module complex
or to the local memory. This module exchanges synchroniza-
tion messages with the control module complex to harmonize
the multiprocessor node's operation.
D. FIBER-OPTIC RING INTERFACE
1 . Description
The four subafea multiprocessor nodes and the two
copies of the Global Data Base (GDB) are linked on a delay
insertion ring network. The cabling, as it has been stated
at the beginning of this chapter, consists of two (distinct
geographic paths) fiber-optic channels. Under the geographi-
cal topology of the C5 system's network, these two rings will
each have an approximate length of 2,000 miles. Point-to-
point fiber-optic communications channels are in operation
today over distances close to 1000 miles [Refs. 13 and 16].
A Bell Company project has started laying telephone fiber-




The bit rate-distance achievable by the commercially
available 1.3 up fiber configuration go up to 500M/sec
[Ref. 14]. The signal loss experienced with the latest ver-
sions of this fiber is 0.5 db per Km [Ref. 11]. This permits
the installation of repeaters every 20 Kms along the ring
without substantial signal strength losses. Their bit error
- 1 7
rate is less than 5 X 10 . Bell reports for the PCM system
a mean time between failures (MTBF) on its cable of 1 million
hours
.
The composite cable design is such that a physical
protection is provided around the fiber-optic cable for both
bend avoidance and physical damage [Ref. 19]. Inside the
same coating, the power cables that are used for operating
the repeaters, can be hosted as well. Recently, such an
underwater working installation was reported as having excel-
lent performance in Tokuyama bay in Japan between offshore
petroleum plants [Ref. 20]. Bell for the PCM system specifies
these power supply needs for the repeaters as 4 Watts (15
Volts) .
Only six interface units are required for the concep-
tual model system described here (4 for the multiprocessor
nodes and 2 for the copies of the GDB) . Twenty to forty
interface units have been already used in some fiber-optic
channel applications. These network interface units have




The effect of radiation on the different kinds of
fiber cables have been tested at the Naval Research Labora-
tory (NRL) [Ref. 21]. A great variety of cables produced
by various manufacturers were considered. Some test results
follow.
ITT ( T-525 ) , Polymar Glass Silica
Radiation Dose : 10° Rads - Si
Loss : 15 db/Km
Bell (SiO^ ~ GeQ 9 -P ? 0^ core ) , Doped Silica
Radiation Dose : 10" Rads - Si
Loss : 7 db/Km
Schott (Si0
2
-GeO ? -B ? 3 -P-, 0- -Sb ? 0,) , Doped Silica
Radiation Dose : 10" Rads - Si
Loss : 1.1 db/Km
In terms of cost, prices vary from less than $100 to
few thousand dollars per Km. Even if some applications would
require an investment of SO. 046 per fiber meter, the prices
for reliable militarv systems are much higher. Table 1 1 -
1
gives a good comparison of cost between metallic and fiber-
optic Links satisfying military communications specifications
The network described in this thesis proposes the
use of a 1.3 »u fiber cable with repeaters placed 10 Kms
apart and a bit rate of lOMb/sec.
The operating characteristics of the Delay Insertion
Ring network used for the model C5 system are described below
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a. Message transmission takes place in the form of
blocks of data called frames. These frames are first loaded
into the Transmission Shift Register (TSR) and then their
routing starts
.
b. A destination address is included in each frame.
c. Traffic on the channel is unidirectional.
d. A local Network (node) interface receiving a
frame, checks its addressees and if its address is not in-
cluded, immediately retransmits it back onto the loop. If
the node's address is found, it keeps a copy of the message
(frame) and makes this fact known by changing a so called
"accept" bit in the frame's bit string.
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e. The originator node verifies message correctness
and the fact that it has been received through the accept
bit's state when it comes back to its interface unit (after
completing one full loop). If so, it removes the whole
message from the channel.
f. The interface unit contains a three position
switch (1:FREE_T0_PASS, 2:TRANSMIT, 5:FREE_RSR). The mech-
anism is shown in Figure 11-10 [Ref. 10]. One interface
unit exists in every node in addition to one unit for each
copy of the Global Data Base (5N/2 units in total for a
system with "n" nodes. Odd nodes are truncated to the lower
even digit)
.
g. The length of a frame (in bytes) is fixed. Mes-
sages are broken into frames of fixed length in order to be
transmitted. The length of the frame equals the length of
the Receiver Shift Register (RSR)
.
2 . Fault Tolerance
There are several cases where faults may occur during
the operation of the network. The most important of them
are mentioned below. Others may exist which are not discussed
here .
a. Global Data base Breakdown
In case one of the GDB copies becomes inoperative,
the other GDB senses its status through a special message.
Then, this other GDB takes over the processing of all multi-













Figure 11-10. Loop Interface Operation.
operational again all changes that have meanwhile been made
to the other copy are transmitted there. This is taken care
of by a mechanism which creates a list of all record addresses
that have been accessed after the occurrence of the failure,
b. Network Interface Breakdown
The standby channel is used to close the loop.
The architecture used is the one proposed in [Ref. 15]
(Figure 11-11) . This architecture provides for a switch in
each one of the interface units to the network which closes
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Figure 11-11. Standby Channel Mechanism.
the transmission route with the standby channel and forces
the legs of both the primary and standby channels, which lead
to the failed node, to idle. This, of course, has as a result
the reduction of data transmission speed over the network
(reduction of the responsiveness of the system) . When the
neighboring nodes sense this change by the reception of a
special message transmitted just before the failed multi-
processor node goes silent, immediately take over the control
of the inoperative subarea's sensors via the alternative
control lines. When the site recovers, the control of these
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sensors is taken back by their mother node. The local data
base is updated as necessary. Closing the gap when two
consecutive nodes fail, is impossible.
c. Channel Failure
The first multiprocessor node's control module
which detects no traffic on the channel for a preestablished
time period "Tc" transmits a special message on the primary
channel declaring that it switches to the standby one. Then
it starts sending its traffic. As soon as the other nodes




It is the division of the network into two or
more parts. It can happen when a node or both the primary
and the standby channel are damaged. In this case the system
will operate as a group of separate surveillance systems (the
best case being when in every partition a GDB is included)
.
T. Minoura and G. Wiederhold [Ref. 45] have introduced the
scheme of a resilient extended true-copy token for distributed
data bases. This scheme supports system partitioning without
any consistency problem. It is based on a precise treatment
of logical data.
A major fault is the breakdown of both GDBs . In




III. DATA STORAGE AND DATA FLOW BETWEEN
NODES IN THE NETWORK OF THE C5 SYSTEM
A. GENERAL
This chapter refers to the surveillance portion of the
conceptual model C3 system. Its objectives are to define
data and data organization, to describe the storage models
used, and to analyze data flow under both normal and abnormal
system's operation.
Data can be categorized into two broad groups: (1) dynamic
data (volatile) and (2) static data (nonvolatile). A better
understanding of these categories as they pertain to this
system can be achieved through the following definitions:
GLOBAL DATA. All data residing in the Global Data base
of the surveillance system.
DYNAMIC DATA . Includes data on targets or other entities
that at any one time are within the limits of the sur-
veillance area (or are about to enter) and are part of
the current operational scenario.
SUBAREA DATA . It is a subset of the dynamic data refer-
ring to the subarea level (the union of the SUBAREA DATA
of all subareas equals the dynamic data in the system).
STATIC DATA . Is the complement of the set of dynamic
data in the GDB
.
The above categorization of data becomes necessary because
of their difference in volatility as they are sensed by the
system. In other words, a surface or air vehicle subject to
continuous tracking has volatile geolocation elements. On
the other hand, entities which belong to the static data
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category, even if they may be moving, do not have high vola-
tile components and the reports on them received by the
surveillance system are occasional or arrive in the form of
intelligence summaries (Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft,
agents, etc.) which refer to long time spans.
Until a so called track of a given contact, which lies
within the detection limits of the system's sensors, can be
established and associated with a ship/aircraft type, all
that is known is a succession of locations (x, y, z coordi-
nate triples). This necessitates the existence of a special
data structure called "TRACK" which includes a sequence of
at least three location reports followed by their correspond-
ing times. A track is generally characterized as dynamic
data
.
It is important that the manipulation of dynamic data
be performed in real-time, so that the risk of suffering a
surprise attack is eliminated. The reduction of the amount
of data considered as dynamic allows for fast access (since
the data can fit into a fast accessed memory arrangement).
On the other hand, greater delays can be followed in
retrieving static data from a much larger storage media
without serious effects on the responsiveness of the system.
As it will be shown further in this chapter, only a data base
can satisfy the needs of storing the static data of the
system. The local data for the subarea is at any time resi-
dent at the local memory of the multiprocessor nodes.

No special software for the manipulation of the data
elements of the data base is included. It is assumed that
such a software package already exists. It can be found in
the open literature [Ref. 15]. The structure of the concep-
tual data (illustrated in Appendix A) allows the implementa-
tion of such a fast executable software which performs the
basic data base functions (get, delete, update, add, create).
The choice is left to the implementor and depends on the
language his particular computer facility supports.
B. STATIC DATA
Static data is characterized as any piece of information
which is not volatile or has a low volatility. For the con-
ceptual surveillance system of this thesis static information
includes all the types of data listed below. Their structure
is also found in the illustrations of Appendix A.
1 . Data Categories
a. Type of Platform
Every radar report is generated by a particular
platform type. A type can be aircraft carrier, cruiser,
destroyer, submarine or it can be a fighter or transport
aircraft, helicopter, merchant ship (oiler, cargo, passenger),
commercial aircraft, etc.
b. Class
The class of a platform of type "X" is important
to be known as well. The class must also include information




All sensors (passive/active) that are known to
exist in the real world are included into the knowledge base
of the surveillance system. Priority is given to the sensors
used by the armed forces of the nations of primary interest.
Under "sensor" a variety of data structures can exist because
the characteristics of a radar, for instance, are different
from the ones of a sonar. In addition, sensors are related
to sites or platforms they are most frequently mounted on
(shore installations or ships/aircraft)
.
d. Weapon
Similar to the above sensor characteristics also
apply to all known types of weapons. Information on the
capabilities of the weapon is of great importance to the
decision-maker who depends on the surveillance system.
e. Naval Base (or Port)
The position, country, name, ships in port,
facilities, defenses, and the operational status of all
Naval bases in the area of interest (in a broad sensej are
needed in performing geoplot data associations.
f. Airfield (or Airport]
Having information on the airfields helps to
determine the nature of the air threat (squadrons, types of




It is almost impossible to keep all the geoloca-
tion history of each individual track. By keeping files of
tactical plots in a data base it is possible to investigate
some incidents and analyze scenarios to derive useful infor-
mation at a later time. The information that is included
in these plot files is the time period covered, area, unit
geoplot information (time/position pair groups for each plat-
form) , and other miscellaneous information.
h. Meteorological Data
Past, present and predicted information on the
meteorological conditions are verv useful to the decision-
maker whenever he is willing to dispatch units and assign
missions. The information included is sea state, wind, cloud
coverage and type, temperatures, humidity, visibility, etc.
i. Hydrographic Data
This is similar to the meteorological information
Hydrographic and sound propagation data (past, present and




The insertion of the rules of engagement into
the knowledge bank of the surveillance system permits the
High Command to impose its will at any time by simply relax-
ing or restricting the use of weapons or tactics during the
various stages of conflict escalation. These restrictions
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are advisory but the knowledge of the ROEs frees the decision
maker from the uncertainty of the political implications of
his actions.
k. Country
It is important to know the elements of the mili-
tary and military related potential each country of interest
has. All ships, aircraft types, merchant ship/aircraft
companies and airfields, airports as well as ports and naval
bases that belong to countries of interest are included.
1 . Company
This entity refers to shipping and airline com-
panies. All merchant ships and commercial aircraft of a
given country are related to a company. A decision-maker
better judges and evaluates information by having access to
such information.
m. Platform
A platform is any mobile vehicle which carries
a sensor or a weapon. It can be a ship, aircraft, submarine
or land vehicle.
n. Site
This data structure includes the coordinates of
each one of the shore sites known to have a weapon launching
capability or are used as mounts for sensors.
o. Missile
The operational characteristics, the identity
signatures (electromagnetic, infrared, optical, acoustical)
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and the country each one of the known missile types belongs
to are considered as vital information. That information is
to be of immediate reach to the surveillance system because
of the imminent threat a missile may present to the friendly
forces
.
2 . Data Relationships
The next very important step in the identification
of the data structures used by the system is the definition
of the set of their interrelationships. The optimization of
data association schemas will have as a result savings in
both storage space and seek time. It will also simplify the
transformation of the information into a storage model and
the formulation of the data base(s).
One of the important things in defining these rela-
tionships is to allow some room for possible future changes
in the data structures (flexibility). For instance, should
an extra component become necessary to be added, some of
the relationships may have to be redefined.
5 . Storage Requirements
Static data has a large storage requirement. Its
volume depends on the extent of coverage of the surveillance
system. For example, in order to record the military poten-
tial of the Soviet Union (types, classes, sensors, weapons
systems, etc.), the storage requirements would be in the
_ g
region of 10 bytes. The addition of information on other
countries and the inclusion of plot, meteorological,
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hydrographic and track information for the surveillance area
(as analyzed above) , increases the storage requirements close
to 10 bytes (once the sensor/weapons systems lists of the
3-4 major manufacturing countries is inserted to the data
base, the rest of the countries will occupy relatively small
space because these same sensors/weapons are used for plat-
form constructions in different combinations) . The above
data storage potential is also sufficient for storing extra
information concerning the whole Command and Control svstem.
Only a data base organization (supported by a DBMS)
is able to permit efficient access to such a large volume of
data within a reasonable time (relative to the needs of
military real-time surveillance system).
This so called global data base (GDB) resides in a
separate node of the network and has its own interface unit.
The GDB is made redundant with the creation of a second copy
which acts as backup and shares the transaction satisfaction
load with its twin sibling. The physical locations of these
two copies of the GDB are so that they reside in every second
multiprocessor node. The above architecture offers the
following advantages
:
a. Increases the throughput on the network since inter
multiprocessor and processor/data base transactions
can be going on simultaneously on different parts of
the network.
b. Reduces the duration of a data base transaction (system's
responsiveness) since each one of the GDB copies
satisfies two multiprocessor nodes requirements.
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c. Increases the survivability of the system in case one
of the GDBs fails.
The extra price paid is the cost of 2 extra inter-
face units to the network (one for each of these FDBs)
.
An alternative that has been considered is to dis-
tribute a copy of the GDB to every subarea node. This idea
was rejected, first because of the higher cost involved, but
mostly because in order to refresh the GDB copy of a failed
and later recovered node would block its interface unit for
a considerable time, practically prolonging the existence
of a time gap in the operation of the system.
The nature of most of the data residing into the GDB
is static and as such they are basically loaded manually or
through interface modules to other information systems.
In one of the sites, where a copy of the GDB is
hosted (primary GDB) , there exists a so called "GDB Custodian
Facility". This facility consists of a number of people,
terminals, and a repertoire of applications programs. The
GDB Custodian Facility collects information from various
sources, as is shown in Figure III-l. This way, the static
data of the GDB is kept updated. Its operation is similar
to that of an intelligence agency, where information has
to be filtered, correlated and assigned a "confidence level".
When the confidence level of a given information chunk exceeds
a preestablished threshold value, the information is used








Figure III-l. GDB Custodian Facility Operation.
To ensure that all necessary components of an infor-
mation chunk have been included during the GDB update, the
application programs have been made interactive. Given the
type of data being updated, a sequence of prompt questions
are posed to the updating personnel.
The priority in satisfying transactions by the GDB
Management System is as follows:
a. Retrieve transactions from subarea sites.
b. Update transactions from subarea sites.
c. Update transactions to the subarea sites.
d. Update transactions made by the GDB Custodian Facility
The above priorities are established to ensure that
the most urgent work is done first and the system performs
in real-time. A number of buffers (spoolers! is used to




When a target detection report is entered to the GDB
via the Custodian Facility (Long Range Maritime Patrol Air-
craft, intelligence, etc.) the following happens:
a. It is determined near which subarea(s) the target's
position lies.
b. The report is routed to this subarea's multiprocessor
node (to be entered into the local memory)
.
c. A search is performed in the GDB based on existing
relations and all related report information is re-
trieved to be sent to the multiprocessor node concerned
The same procedure is followed whenever a target is
first detected by the sensor of a subarea and this initial
report is sent to the GDB. Of course, in this case some
extra data are needed in order that the target be identified.
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Figure III-2. New Reoort Data in GDB
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4 . Response Times
A good organization of the data and their relation-
ships in the data base (relational data base) is estimated
that will permit an average of 50 milliseconds access time.
This number includes also the communications delay (due to
the length of the fiber-optic cable) and assumes an average
traffic load on the ring network [Ref. 10].
Based on that response time, the following rough
calculations can be made to find the throughput of the
network
:
Single Transaction Response Time
Number of Transactions per Second




Global Data base Update (every 30 scan periods)
50 X 120 = 3,600 transactions
The number of 5,600 GDB transactions that can be
performed per GDB update includes both routine and nonroutine
transactions. Routine transactions are record updates.
Nonroutine transactions take place in the cases of first
detections, track initializations and imminent threat reports
The above throughput is considered as adequate for any prac-
tical requirements of the proposed C3 system.
C. DYNAMIC DATA
All information that is related to the scenario in
progress in the surveillance area is called dynamic. Local
data is a subset of the dynamic data and refers to an in-
dividual subarea. Dynamic data is of two types, reference
data and tracks/reports on platforms.
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Reference data is static data that must be available in
the local memory of a multiprocessor node so as to enable it
in carrying out its identification and classification functions
Track/report data form a separate data structure type
which is described later in this section.
1 . Reference Data
For each track which has been identified to belong
to a specific platform, all information about the type, class,
sensors/weapons systems it is equipped with, and its home-
port are included in the reference data set. Meteorological
and hydrographic data referring to the present and predicted
conditions as well as the immediately previous and current
plots for the subarea are also included. The above informa-
tion is supplemented with data on imminent threat platforms
(e.g. when a specific fire control radar (FCR) is intercepted,
it gives the indication that an enemy missile is about to be
launched). Finally, the rules of engagement (ROE) in effect
at any time constitute part of the reference data.
Reference data insure the subarea Commander's inde-
pendence and make the response of the system as a whole more
rapid. The mechanisms which are used for updating the ref-
erence data set (additions/deletions) of each individual





A track is a data structure which has at least the
following components:
a. Two or more positions (x, y coordinates) together with
reference times (two locations only when the positions
are a result of a visual identification)
.
b. Track number (as in Chapter IV, Section E)
.
In addition, the inclusion of the following compo-
nents into the structure of a track are considered as helpful
in increasing the responsiveness of the surveillance system.
c. Heading derived from consecutive locations.
d. Speed calculated on the basis of locations and their
corresponding times (can be analyzed into three sub-
components in the directions of the principal coordi-
nate system's axes).
e. Size of contact, as it is sensed by the detecting
sensor
.
f. Type of target, such as cruiser, submarine, helo
,
fighter aircraft, etc.
g. Plot the track is related to.
The values of the components (c) through (g) are not
necessarily always known. It becomes clear at this stage
that whatever relation is to be established between a track
and the GDB , it must be based on positional data (including
time)
.
A report is a special case of a track. It includes
only one positional component and a "track-no". Depending
on the type of the detecting sensor, it may or may not in-
clude the rest of the components of a track. For reasons
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of simplicity, a report is handled by this system as a track
with null values assigned to some of its components. Figure
1 1 1 - 3 shows the structure of a typical track record as it
is conceptualized above. An extra field is reserved for
linking purposes (next)
.
tr no tl t2 t3 psl ps2 ps3
1
size heading speed type plot next
Figure III-5. Track Record Structure.
A typical relationship of a track is discussed below
TRACK - PLOT .
Starting from the moment one of the surveillance
system's sensors locates and starts tracking a given target,
the following questions demand an answer:
a. How can the track be associated with a type?
'.v'here did it come from?
What threat does it pose?
b
c
d How is the track related to the general tactical
picture?
In order to answer these questions it is necessary
to use some of the relationships of the previous section




Figure III-4. Relation o£ TRACK to PLOT.
3 . Storage Requirements
The nature of the surveillance system described in
this thesis is such that real-time performance is what must
be of primary consideration. As a consequence of this, data
must be represented, related and organized in the memory in
such a way, so to be accessible as fast as possible.
The data structure the system has to do with more
frequently is the TRACK (or REPORT) . It is important to
identify this entity (especially if moving fast). So, ele-
ments of the TRACK are used in the formation of an index
to the local memory.
The components (or fields) of a track can be sepa-
rated into two broad categories, the "overt" and "covert"
ones. The first are the ones directly sensed by the sensors
of the system. They are TIME, LOCATION (x, y, z) and SIZE
of return. All the rest are covert and take assigned values




Generalizing things a little more, it is almost cer-
tain that the approximate location of a given TRACK will
always be known. If the chosen basis for calculating the
key component to address the track record is the location of
the track (last sensed position) , it is implicit that one
of the two coordinate systems used in operations should be
chosen.
The cartesian is much more suitable than the polar
coordinate system for the network wide coordinate system.
To minimize the average data seek-time and avoid
large deviations from this average, a close to uniform dis-
tribution of records into the local memory is desirable.
Through a division of the whole area covered by the
surveillance system into equal size squares it is possible
to distribute the TRACKs according to their location almost
uniformly. It must be realized that some squares will be
more dense during several "time spans" and some others will
have a continuously high density (focal points, such as
vicinity to ports and airport terminal areas)
.
The size of the manageable square area in terms of
track capacity and practical handling, as well as the size
of the total area which is kept under surveillance by the
system, determine which hashing method will be used.
a. Surveillance Area Size
Neither of the x, y dimensions of the surveillance
area exceeds the 1000 N.M. Under the coordinate grid addressed
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above, every track can be referred through the triple x, y,
z where both x and y range from 000 to 999, and z from
-3,000 to 100,000 feet for all realistic purposes,
b. Manageable Area
In a modern naval conflict scenario or in a
tension period situation (which are the two cases where speed
is of great importance) no more than 20 tracks are likely to
coexist within a 10 X 10 square miles area extended vertically
to the limits defined above.
The above assumptions make the implementation of
a hashing function possible, which uses the most significant
two digits of the track's x and y coordinates as an index
to the hash table.
For example, a track's last location x=217, y=522,
z=17300 is expressed as 21, 52. If now these two numbers
are concatenated so as to form a 4 digit integer, they can
be easily used as an index to a storage block address.
This arrangement facilitates the fast association
of a track lying in adjacent squares (they occupy memory
locations close to each other in a storage media) and allows
for a continuous rearrangement of tracks into blocks as they
move in the real three-dimensional space.
This hash function can be implemented in a Pascal-




address := hash (x,y);
Function declaration
function hash (X ,Y : real) : integer
;
hash := (integer (X)/10)*100 + integer (Y) /10
;
end;
The total memory capacity requirements for the dynamic
data storage is estimated to be in the order of 1Mb. This
data can be stored on RAM memory commercially available today.
4 . Response Times
The response times that are estimated as achievable
by the system for the dynamic data are equal to real-time.
This is accomplished by the partitioning of the dynamic data
and by distributing the partition elements into the local
memories of the multiprocessor nodes. This way, communica-
tions delays are eliminated for all practical purposes and
the overhead to access dynamic data is minimized. An average
data access operation can be completed in less than 1.4 sec
(access to the bus and memory I/O). This way, within the 6
seconds of a scan period, a minimum of 4,500,000 memory
accesses can be accomplished at the multiprocessor node level.
This number exceeds the needs of the surveillance
system and leaves room for comfortably using the shared
memory to store ether information as well (e.g. correlation
processes and other software modules which are loaded for






The data that flows between the different parts of the
system consists of records and special messages. The records
represent the data entities described in the previous sections
of this chapter. Special messages are used for system control
and synchronization.
Data flow on the internode network makes use of the
fiber-optic ring structure and consists of frames of data
that also contain address (es) and other network control infor-
mation. Inside the multiprocessor node, data flow between
the module groups makes use of a time shared parallel system's
bus .
In the following paragraphs the mechanisms used to ensure
the fast and reliable flow of data are described both, inside
the multiprocessor node and for the internode netivork.
1 . Data Flow on the Network
The information exchange requirements of the subarea
nodes govern the flow of data along the network. This flow
gives a clear view of how the system operates.
The major advantage of the register insertion ring
network, used in this architecture in terms of data flow is
that multiple transactions between nodes can be going on
simultaneously.
In each node, the data before it enters the Transmit
Shift Register (TSR) is converted into "frames" that include
some extra control bits and the addresses of the originator
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of the frame and its destination. These bits are called the
"match" and the "accept" bits. They are part of the overhead
which is used to verify that the transmitted data has been
properly received by the addressee nodes. The way this is
done is described in Table III-l below.
TABLE III-l
MATCH AND ACCEPT BITS




The message was addressed to a node that
does not exist; no interface unit recognizes
the message.
1 The message was successfully transmitted to
one or more nodes; at least one interface
unit recognized the message.
1 No node received the message; however, at
least one interface unit recognized the
address in the message.
1 1 The message was addressed to nodes in at
least 2 subareas . At least one interface
unit was able to copy it and at least one
was unable to copy it.
Both "match" and "accept" bits are initialized to
"0". When the frame they are attached to makes a complete
circuit on the ring, the RSR of the originator node checks
their status and the correctness of the bit string compared
to the transmitted one. If the message bit string is found
to be correct, the accept/match bits are examined. In case
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a 0-1 is found, the originator's interface unit removes the
frame from the network. Otherwise, it retransmits the cor-
rect message.
Any node interface unit recognizing its address in
a frame changes the accept bit into "1" (after successfully
copying the carried message) . The match bit is changed to
"1" by a receiving node whenever a successful copy has not
been achieved.
a. GDB to the Multiprocessor Node
The data of the surveillance system which flow
from the GDB to a multiprocessor node are records of entities
which, either have been requested by the node addressed or
have been judged as necessary to be sent to the node(s).
This last category of transmitted data is a result of the
insertion of new data (static) into the GDB through the GDB
Custodian Facility and have as a result a change of the
operational scenario. The sequence followed in order to
initialize such a transmission is illustrated in Figure 1 1 1 - 5
The GDB node initiating such a transmission is
the primary one (the one that has the GDB Custodian Facility)
In satisfying a multiprocessor node's request,
the GDB node which as received the request, transmits the
requested record to the node (the requestor's address has
been kept in the spooler). This mechanism's operation is
illustrated in Figure III-6.
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Figure III-6. Request Satisfaction by the GDB
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Normally each GDB copy serves the requests of two
multiprocessor nodes (Figure III-7). In this figure, each
dot-surrounded box indicates the GDB which collaborates with







Figure III-7. Collaborating Nodes.
b. From a GDB to a GDB
Such an information flow occurs whenever data
is inserted to the primary GDB through the GDB Custodian
Facility. All the so inserted information is transmitted
to the other copy of the GDB independent of its transaction
to any other multiprocessor node(s). This way, the two
copies of the global data base are kept identical.
85

c. Multiprocessor Node to the GDB
The data transmitted from a node to the GDB is
of several kinds. First of all, an initial report of an
object, detected by a sensor of the subarea, is transmitted
to the GDB with a maximum delay of 6 seconds. In addition
to this, whenever a track on this object (platform or missile)
has been obtained, it is also transmitted to the GDB.
The rest of the data flow (node to GDB) consists
of track record uodate messages which are sent in the form
of frames. Since that kind of data are, under normal condi-
tions, vital to the subarea Commander, their transmission
to the GDB is done every 5 scan periods (rapid transmission
is not necessary for that data). In the meanwhile, data
which are to be transmitted by a multiprocessor node during
the next transmission are stored in special transmit buffer
complex. Figure III-8 illustrates how this mechanism works.
gsaagsa
TRACK
K = K + 1 LOCAL MEMORY
IGDB
ADDRESS TSR :ommunicationsChannel
Figure III -3. Global Data Base Update with Dynamic Data
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d. Among Multiprocessor Nodes
The data flow between the system's multiprocessor
nodes consist of dynamic data that refers to tracks which
have motion going from the transmitting subarea to that of
the addressee (s) . The criteria used for initiating such
transmissions are their vicinity to the boundary line between
the two subareas and their heading. These criteria can be
altered to include all track data in the subarea whenever
the addressee node's subarea Commander is assigned the coor-
dination of the operations within the transmitting node's
and his own subarea.
These transmissions are done following the same
transmission intervals with the global data base (GDB) updates
(every 50 seconds)
.
2 . Data Flow Inside the Multiprocessor Node
All data flows inside the multiprocessor node through
the common bus. The difference from the data flow on the
network is that for each individual sensor complex the data
which flows in and out of its module group is in terms of
the records of the data structure it supports. For instance,
the Electronic Support Measures (ESM) module group's complex
will receive or transmit only active SENSOR records (radars,
IFF equipment, jammers, etc.) and REPORTS before and after
triangulat ion has been achieved.
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The reference data, as it comes into the multiprocessor
node's environment, is loaded to the shared memory of each
individual module group (related data only)
.
Whenever the control module group gives a synchroni-
zation message to the different module groups they send their
correlated data (track or report records) to the shared
memory, and the sensor combination module complexes so the
information may be further classified. This does not apply
to the initial detection reports which are transmitted directly
to the TSR. Data coming from the sensor combination module
complexes is loaded into the local memory. In addition it
is sent to the transmit buffers of the node's network inter-
face unit. The processor which is attached to the local
memory module complex assigns track numbers to the incoming
new reports and returns these track numbers to the originating
module complex(es).
The description of the inter module complex data flow
is omitted from this chapter (it is given in Chapter IV).
The flow of data in the multiprocessor node environ-
ment is shown in Figure III-9.
Once in every scan period (6 seconds) data from each
one of the sensor module complexes flows towards the Local
Memory, the Multisensor Complex (Radar/ESM complex in Figure
111-10), the I/O module to the ring interface unit (initial
reports only) and the I/O module which serves the human





















Figure III-9. Data Flow Inside the
Multiprocessor Node.
The Radar/ESM complex outputs data for the Local
Memory and the Sensor Module complexes , where the derived
discrete characteristics of each report or track are added
to their records as well as the assigned track number. Just
after this complex classifies a track (or report) as hostile,
its record is also routed to the I/O modules. This data
flow takes place every 6 seconds also.
The Local Memory transmits GDB update data once every
30 scan periods (3 minutes). This transmission is done
through the I/O module interfacing the ring.
E. DATA FLOW IN CASE OF FAILURES
The failures which are considered in this section refer
to the major components of the distributed surveillance
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network. These failures will be examined from the aspect
of their effect on the flow of data. Namely, the failures
that are addressed in the following paragraphs are link
failure, node failure, interface unit failure and system
saturation.
1 . Link Failure
When a link connecting two different nodes on the
channel fails, no traffic is further received by the second
node (in the direction data normally flows) . This second
node detects the link failure by lacking any input on the
RSR of its interface unit for ten loop periods. This time
is equal to 100 microseconds (which equals the time it takes
for a bit to complete ten full loops on a 5,000 Km fiber-
optic cable under uninterrupted flow conditions) . Both the
primary and the secondary GDBs , every one loop delay period
transmit a special bit string to indicate that they are still
"active" on the network (normally one of these bit strings
is received every 5 microseconds) . The detecting node assumes
that a link failure has occurred prior to it. The control
module complex of this subarea's multiprocessor node gener-
ates a special message. This message is transmitted on the
primary channel and immediately following all data flow orig-
inating from this node starts being transmitted through the
standby channel.
The rest of the nodes, as soon as they receive this





With this arrangement no data is lost since a copy
of all frames transmitted by any one of the nodes on the
network is kept at the originator's transmit buffers until
it can be compared with the returning identical frame. This
way, no data is lost since the frames can be retransmitted
on the standby channel.
When the originally primary channel becomes opera-
tional again it acts as a standby channel since there is no
difference between the two of them.
2 . Node Failure
As it has been defined previously, the nodes can be
categorized as GDB nodes and multiprocessor nodes. Each one
of these node categories, even if it has a similar interface
unit to the network, serves a different purpose. So a failure
of a node belonging to one of these categories must be sep-
arately discussed. However, some reactions of the network
to node failures of both of these categories are similar.
a. GDB Node Failure
Each GDB's node interface unit has an extra
mechanism which produces a characteristic 16 bit string and
transmits it on the communications channel once in every ten
loop delay periods. When this string returns to its origi-
nator GDB, a part of it is incremented by 1 and immediately
retransmitted. Each GDB has its own characteristic bit string




When a node hosting a copy of the GDB fails, it
becomes unable to accept requests from the multiprocessor
nodes it serves. By being unable to increment its character-
istic bit string, it allows the node hosting the other GDB
copy to detect the failure. After failure detection, the
other copy of the GDB takes over the satisfaction of all
node requests. As a consequence, the throughput on the chan-
nel is reduced down to the half of the normal. Still, the
system is able to operate, since the number of transactions
is less than the capacity of the single GDB.
Failed GDB recovery is handled in steps. For
all the GDB records that have been updated an address list
is kept and only the last update made to the record is stored
there. Addresses and records are kept in parallel arrays of
address/buffer pairs which are used during the refresh of
the recovered GDB. When the last of these buffers is emptied,
a message from the refreshing GDB triggers the reactivation
of the bit-string incrementing mechanism of the recovered
GDB. From this moment the system restarts its normal opera-
tion again.
The above GDB failure management procedure is
hidden from the multiprocessor nodes which keep addressing
their requests to "the GDB" (one address exists for both GDB
copies, but their interface units are smart enough to satisfy




b. Multiprocessor Node Failure
The failure of a multiprocessor node creates a
greater problem for the surveillance system because all in-
formation on the activity taking place in the subarea it
supports is denied to the rest of the system. In this case
the interface unit transmits a special message (bit string)
on the network channel which announces the inoperativeness
of the node.
Adjacent subarea' s multiprocessor nodes receiving
this message immediately activate their switch boxes which
close the alternate connections with the sensors normally
controlled by the failed node. This sensor sharing is pre-
agreed and on a 50/50 basis.
In addition to the extra processing load they
take, the set of the local data of the failed node is sent
to the take-over nodes from the GDB. This, on one hand in-
creases the traffic on the channel, but on the other reduces
the complexity of processing at the multiprocessor level
(there exists reference data)
.
The reverse process (node recovery) is simpler
since all the necessary local data, as well as the control
of the sensors, are passed back in a stepwise fashion.
3 . Node Interface Failure
In this case, the same as in the failed node problem
handling sequence takes place as for the control of the
sensors. The difference lies in the utilization of the
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communications channel. Since the interface unit is inoper-
ative, the traffic cannot go through. So the ring loop
closes by the special arrangement shown in Figure 11-11 with
the utilization of the standby channel. In this case a
greater communications delay is exercised on all internode
transactions because of the cable length increase. This is
the minimum price which can be paid.
4 . Network Saturation
Network saturation occurs whenever a GDB refresh takes
place or when a node which had failed recovers and its SUBAREA
DATA is updated. In these cases the data flow on the channel
increases substantially and the network becomes saturated.
To avoid this kind of saturation, a so called "SLOW/FAST
mechanism" counts the length of the transaction queues at the
interface unit's receive buffers. When this length exceeds
a preestablished threshold value, the node suffering a long
queue transmits a "SLOW" message which forces the rate of
the dynamic data update to be reduced so that instead of 30
scan periods (which is the standard) it becomes 50+10. This
incrementation continues on an n+10 basis up to 60 scan periods
(6 minutes) if it is required. When the length of the queues
on all nodes starts decreasing, the node which has transmitted
the last "SLOW" message starts transmitting a "FAST" message
that decrements the number of scan periods corresponding to
the system's rate of operation by 10 (the same way) down to
the standard of 30 scan periods (3 minutes).
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5 . Multiprocessor Node Saturation
It is possible for a given surveillance subarea to
experience a high target density situation. In this case,
if by utilizing the standby processors it hosts, it becomes
impossible to satisfy the surveillance requirements in its
subarea, another node's contribution is requested.
The procedure followed requires the saturated node
to transmit a special "OVERLOAD" message, which indicates
that a node is ready to transfer the control of some of its
sensors lying close to adjacent subareas . The sequence of
transfer is preestablished (e.g. specific radars are listed
in an array) . This hand-over procedure takes place in steps
(layer stripping). When the load at the overloaded multi-
processor node is reduced, a "RELAX" message is transmitted
by the node which has originated the OVERLOAD message and
the control of its sensors is reassumed in reverse order.
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IV. DATA AND PROGRAM ORGANIZATION WITHIN
THE COMPUTING NODE
A. PROCESS/TASK ORGANIZATION
Each of the computing nodes of the C5 system has a simi-
lar internal process/task organization. Processes specially
designed for the manipulation of data of all the sensors/
weapons systems do reside into each computing (or processing)
node. This enables the nodes to exercise their take-over
functions whenever neighboring nodes fail.
In this section only the organization of the processes
in the radar module complex will be presented in detail
(Figure IV-1). Similar is the structure of the rest of the
sensors/weapons systems module complexes with minor
differences
.






















Figure IV-1. Time Sequence of Processes in




The assumptions on which the organization of the
processes is based are listed below:
a. All radars are surface search ones with an equal
Aerial Rotation Period (ARP) of 6 seconds (otherwise referred
to as "scan period"). There is no height finding capability.
b. Radar detection sectors are circular with a radius
equal to their maximum detection range. This helps in reduc-
ing redundancy and in resolving conflicts in cases where two
neighboring radars happen to be tracking the same target.
c. Each individual radar in the subarea can have
regions of overlapping sectors with at most 4 neighboring
radars. In addition, no more than 5 different radar sectors
can overlap over any given region. This assumption is not
considered as strictly restrictive to the system. It would
be able to function even if 5 or 6 radar sectors where over-
lapping (with some modifications in the software)
.
d. The velocities of the targets the system may
track are up to 1000 knots. Minor modifications to the soft-
ware modules would enable the tracking of targets with higher
velocities .
e. Target density in the area is 0.007 targets/sq/Km.
f. Targets can be of any of the following types






(4) A/C and missiles flying at low altitude.
2 . Process Organization
The software modules of the Radar module complex are
organized so as to be executed by dedicated and nondedicated
single board computers (SBC) . A description of each one of
these and of the Radar interface processes follows (the SBCs
dedicated to the execution of the radar interface modules
are physically located at the radar sites instead of at the
multiprocessor node)
.
5 . Radar Interface Module (RIM)
Each radar is directly (point-to-point) connected to
the radar module complex through an interface unit. Inter-
face units are located close to the radar site. All detection
signals (reports) from the radars are transmitted in real-
time through wiring to their corresponding interface units.
These reports (raw analog data) include the polar coordinates
of each radar return (report) and a size value for these
returns. The RIM converts the polar coordinates into car-
tesian (x, y) in Km. In addition, it attaches to this position
a time component taken from a copy of the global clock. The
report record formed has the following structure:
REPORT (time, x_coord, y_coord, size)
Note: The size of a report is measured on a scale 1 to 3.
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All reports, after they have been processed, are
loaded into the SCAN REPORT BUFFER. This buffer holds the
reports acquired over one scan period (6 seconds)
.
The initiation of the new scan period is done by the



















Figure IV-2. Radar Interface Module.
4 . Local Correlation Module (LCM)
Each RIM is connected through fiber-optic cable to
a SBC at the multiprocessor node's physical location. This
SBC is dedicated to the execution of a Local Correlation
Module corresponding to its particular radar sector. Every
radar sector is divided into four quadrant sectors (000-090
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090-180, etc.)- This division is used by the system's over-
load handling mechanism which will be described later in this
chapter. This module every 6 seconds (scan period) reads-in
the report data from the RADAR BUFFER of its assigned RIM
and does the following:
a. Uses special overload relaxing mechanisms that
take over in cases where the number of reports loaded in "X"
from the radar buffer at any one scan is greater than 40.
b. Attempts to associate report data with the already
existing tracks.
c. Initializes new tracks.
d. Separates the data that belong to tracks which
are in the regions where the sector overlaps with other
sectors
.
e. Updates the shared memory with the remaining
data.
Each LCM maintains a number of internal buffers in
order to facilitate data manipulation. These are:
a. Buffer "X"
It keeps report data that is read from the SCAN
REPORT BUFFER of the RIM.
b. Unresolved Reports Buffer "T"
It holds the report data which has not been
associated with any track, or has not been used to initialize
a track for six consecutive scan periods (56 seconds).
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c. Temporary Track Pool "TPOOL"
It keeps all "alive" track data in the radar
sector (a track is erased if no update has taken place for
56 consecutive seconds)
.
d. Track Pool "POOL"
It holds tracks that have been successfully as-
sociated with report data, initialized tracks or reports
which have been acquired during the last scan.
e. Shared Memory Update Buffer "Y"
It keeps the data that does not need further
correlation, and is ready to update the subarea shared memory.
f. Exchange Buffers "Z"
They hold the track data of the regions where
the radar sector overlaps with neighboring ones.
g. Exchange Buffers "RP OVER FLOW"
These buffers are filled only in cases where the
number of reports loaded in "X" is greater than 40 (which is
considered as the upper capacity limit for "X") . Its con-
tents are the reports falling within the limits of the quadrant
of the radar sector lying close to another radar sector.
These reports are erased from the overloaded internal buffer
"X" .
h. Exchange Buffers "TR OVER FLOW"
These buffers are filled only in cases where the
corresponding "RP_OVER_FLOW" buffers have been filled, and





Note: Each radar sector is divided into the four principal
quadrants (000-090, 090-180, etc.) In cases where an
SBC which is dedicated to a particular radar becomes
overloaded, its load is relaxed by a standby SBC
which takes over the handling of target reports lying
inside one or two quadrants until the original pro-
cessor is no longer overloaded. When the situation
at the "parent radar" sector is relaxed, the original
processor takes over again the handling of the reports
and tracks that physically belong to it.






















Figure IV-5. Local Correlation Module.
The internal view of the module fas described













Figure IV-4. Local Correlation Module
Internal View.
The operation of the LCM can be summarized as
follows
:
a. Track records are transferred from POOL to TPOOL,
and POOL is cleared.
b. "Old" reports, and tracks are erased from both T,
and TPOOL.
c. If the number of reports in X is greater than 40,
then some of the data in the internal buffers X, T and TPOOL
is transferred to standby processors (relaxed).
d. Reports in X are associated with "alive" tracks in
TPOOL in two passes (one with the assumption that the target
is moving with a constant velocity and heading, and the other
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with a realistic change of these attributes) . Each associated
report/track pair is erased from X and TPOOL respectively,
and is written into POOL.
e. Remaining reports in X are merged with reports in T,
where track initialization is attempted. For each successful
initialization, the track is written into POOL and these
reports are erased from T. Reports which have not been used
for track initiation are considered as initia reports and are
loaded into POOL. At the end of this phase X must be empty.
Reports and initialized tracks are assigned a track_no.
f. The reports in T which fall in a radar common region
are loaded into POOL.
g. Tracks and Reports in POOL (which now all have their
temporary track_number) are distributed according to their
geographical position among the Y and Z buffers.
h. The shared memory is updated with track data in Y.
i. Buffers Z are unloaded into the EXCHANGE BUFFERS.
The following algorithms formalize the operation:
PI: (corresponds to sector 1)
do forever
call await (evc(l), TH(1))
input (radar buffer reports into X)
empty radar buffer
if no reports = 10 then
iF sum_reports = 40 then
caTl de relax (resume handling of passovers)
call transfer (track records from POOL to TPOOL)
if no_reports 40 then
call relax (pass handling of some reports
and tracks to standby processor)
call correlatel (correlates/initializes tracks)
call separatel (separates tracks in POOL into Y,Z)
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output (tracks in Z to exchange buffers)
empty buffers Z
call update (update shared memory from Y)
call advance (evc(l,i)) (increment the event count
of the common region cor-
relation modules)





(report -to- track correlation)
clear TPOOL from "old" tracks
clear T from "old" reports
call pass 1 (extrapolate each track in TPOOL and
associate with each report in X by
report - to- track association)
call pass2 (extrapolate each remaining track in TPOOL
associate and with each remaining report
in X by report-to- track association)
call initialize (merge reports in X and T into T,and




"Await" and "advance" are synchronization primi-
tives ivhich are used to check if the event count has exceeded
the threshold value (both passed as actual parameters) , and
to increment the event count respectively.
5 . Common Region Correlation Module (CRCM)
The modules of this kind are of two types. The "dual-
region", and the "triple region" ones. Their only differ-
ence is that the former handles the cases where target tracks
exist inside the limits of two instead of three radar sectors
overlapping regions. CRCMs are not executed by dedicated
processors. Any one of a group of SBCs which is available
executes them.
The input to these modules is a set of track records
in the format described in the LCM subsection. Their output
is updates to the shared memory.
10 5

The cycle is repeated every 6 seconds (one radar scan
period), and can be summarized as follows:
a. Track- to- track association (two different radars).
b. Track number correction (when necessary).
c. Shared memory update.
d. For triple regions steps (1) and (2) are done twice.

















Figure IV-5. Common Region Correlation Module.
The following internal buffers are considered as
necessary for its efficient functioning:
a. Buffers "Yl": They hold all track records as they
are read from the various EXCHANGE BUFFERS.
b. Buffer "YR": It holds successfully associated tracks
which are ready to update the memory module.
106

c. Buffer "YTR" : It holds tracks successfully associated,
and candidates for further association (only in triple
common region correlation modules)
.
d. Buffer "AT": It holds pairs of track numbers which
belong to tracks or reports that have been successfully
associated in the past.
The internal views of a dual, and a triple CRCMs are
shown in Figures IV-6, and IV-7 respectively.
from Shared Memory
SHARED MEMORY ^>
Figure IV-6. Internal View of Dual CRCM.
The operation of the CRCM can be summarized as follows
a. Buffer AT (Associated Tracks) is loaded directly
from the shared memory.
b. Each one of the tracks coming from the exchange
buffer of one of the LCMs is associated with each one of the
tracks coming from one of the exchange buffers of the other
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Figure IV-7. Internal View of Triple CRCM.
LCM. The track number of each successfully associated track
is changed and the pair of these two track numbers is loaded
into buffer AT.
c. Associated tracks are transferred to YR and
erased from the Yls.
d. Remaining tracks are transferred to YR (unassociated)
Note: For the triple CRCMs the remaining tracks are trans-
ferred to YTR, and the track- to- track association is
repeated once more among the contents of YTR and the
third Yl (finally all reports are transferred to YR)
.
e. The shared memory is updated with the contents
of YR, and all internal buffers are emptied.
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The following algorithms describe the above functions
in a formal way:
P12: (common region of sectors 1 and 2)
do forever
call await (evc(l,2), TH(1,2))
input (exchange buffers reports into Yls)
input (association pairs into AT buffer)
empty exchange buffers
call correlate2 (track- to- track associations)
call update (updates the shared memory from YR)
emptv buffers Yl, YR, AT
TH(1,2) = TH(1,2) + 2
end
end P12
P123: (common region of sectors 1,2, and 5)
do forever
call await (evc(l,2,5), TH(1,2,3))
input (exchange buffers into Yls)
input (association triples or pairs into AT buffer)
empty exchange buffers
call correlate2 (tracks of the two first Yls)
call correlate2 (tracks of remaining Yl , and
YTR)
call update (updates the shared memory)
empty buffers Y1,YTR,YR
TH(1,2,5) = TH(1,2,3) + 3
end
end P123
Note: Indices in eves and THs refer to the serial numbers
of the radars involved in the cross -correlation .
6 . Scheduler Module (SM)
This module controls the whole operation of the radar
complex of the surveillance system. Its only output is the
so called "sixsec_evc" which flags the start of each new
scan period (6 seconds) and comes from a local clock. This
is synchronized by the multiprocessor control module complex
through a synchronization message. Its outputs are two kinds
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of event counts, interface modules, and one to the local
correlation modules (rad_evc and eve respectively)
.
The SM is executed by a dedicated SBC. This module
also controls the operation of the clock and initiates the
unloading of all track report data residing in the shared
memory into the local memory module and the multisensor cor-
relation complexes which further associate them with data
gathered by other sensor systems.
Its functionality can be better shown in the follow-
ing algorithm:
P:
call start (start the system and the global clock)
do forever
call await (six_evc , TH)
for each eve set do
call advance (rad_evc (i) ) (for the ith radar
interface module)




TH = TH + 1
end do
end P
7 . Shared Memory
The shared memory of the radar module complex is a
64K RAM memory which holds both data and processes. The data
stored there are the track records, the unassociated reports
and the track_number association pairs/triples mentioned in
the previous paragraphs. All these refer to the currently
tracked platforms. All the processes used in the module
complex are stored in the shared memory. The space blocks
occupied by processes and data are predefined.
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Whenever one of the CRCMs is invoked, a nondedicated
processor (SBC) of the complex is utilized, the proper process
is loaded into the SBC's own memory and execution begins.
The block of the shared memory holding the track/
report data is transmitted on the bus to the multisensor
system correlation, local memory and I/O module complexes of
the multiprocessor node. This action is controlled by the
SM. Figure IV-8 shows how the shared memory of the radar





Figure IV-8. Shared Memory Division
8. Module Integration
Since all module's internal structure has been
described in detail, the integrated system consisting of all
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Figure IV-9. Integrated System's View
The time that is required by the radar module complex
to perform the correlation of all data collected over one
radar scan period is critical to the operation of the whole
system.
A time analysis of events is shown in Figure IV-10.
There, the required time each one of the processes takes to
process a maximum number of 40 "active" tracks is given in
scale. These maximum times (6 seconds) correspond to the
time it will take to perform 40 track initializations (40
reports on the last scan and about a hundred of previous
scan reports in buffer "T" taken in triples in all combina-
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Figure IV-10. Time Analysis of Events.
takes to be manipulated is indicated with shadowed boxes
within the 6 sec boxes. If the process terminates sooner
than in 6 seconds, the processor stays idle until the data
of the next scan period arrives.
B. DATA CORRELATION
One of the critical functions of the radar module complex
in the multiprocessor node is the synthesis of radar infor-
mation about enemy, friendly, and unknow identity ships,
submarines, aircraft, and missiles in the subarea.
In order to cope with the situation, modern ocean sur-
veillance systems had to become computerized. What computers
are called to do is to replace human operators in target
tracking and classification (partially). Both of these
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processes rely primarily on the correlation of data items
referring to the various targets in the area. This data
either preexists in a data base, or is collected by a chain
of sensors.
The required output of a computerized surveillance system
consists of a set of resolved target tracks, followed by as
much extra information as desirable. In order to do these
tasks, the following steps must be completed in real-time:
a. Track update/initiation.
b. Calculation of more geolocation data (velocity, heading,
etc.) for each track.
c. Estimation of additional constant, and discrete track
characteristics
.
The above steps directly imply the use of data correla-
tion (or association) algorithms. A great variety of such
algorithms have been developed over the last 20 years. Some
survey papers [Refs. 12, 22 and 25] reflect most of these
efforts. In addition, a project by the Naval Research Lab-
oratory (Washington, D.C.) has produced a great variety of
papers and reports on the subject. The Naval Ocean-Surveillance
Correlation Handbook project [Refs. 6, 24] is an overview
of the existing literature in this area. It also summarizes
the major topics of research towards more efficient correla-
tion algorithms (in terms of speed and reliability).
Most of the existing algorithms provide for multiple
target tracking, track initiation, isolation of false alarms,
coping with missing measurements, and other general or special
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cases (as merging, splitting, etc. of tracks) which will be
analyzed in more detail in the following sections. Among
them, there is a group of algorithms which imply "multiple-
scan correlation", "sophisticated data partitioning", "recur-
siveness", and take advantage of the discrete in addition to
the continuous target characteristics. These algorithms are
faster than the rest.
The present section overviews the general surveillance
correlation algorithm characteristics. It further concen-
trates on the ones used by this system.
Correlation algorithms can be categorized into report-to-
report, report- to- track and track- to- track . Each one of




Some clarification is considered necessary for under-
standing correlation algorithms in general as well as for
the specific ones used by the proposed system. Collected
data must be associated with data existing in some storage
area. This way, the most reliable information can be derived
for each individual target within the limits of the surveillance
area, and the decision-makers will have a clear picture on
which to base their decisions.
The region is scanned in three dimensions (air,
surface, and subsurface), with the objective of collecting
as much reliable information as necessary, primarily on
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hostile or potentially hostile targets (geolocation , discrete,
and constant characteristics)
.
REPORT: A formated description of an observation by a
sensor of the surveillance system. Each report includes
a time of observation plus geolocation data (range and
bearing from the radar position)
.
SCAN DATA: A set of reports coming from the same radar,
which were obtained during a scan period. At most one
report of a scan refers to each target in the area.
TRACK: A set of reports obtained over an extended time
span, which are judged as relating to the same platform.
FALSE ALARM: A contact detection coming from a sensor,
not originating from a real target.
TARGET CORRELATION: The decision that two or more ele-
ments in the set of collected data have a specific
relation
.
2 . Overall Correlation
When the sensors of the surveillance system are
locally separated (as for the system described in this
thesis) , the conversion of the incoming geolocation data to
a common coordinate system is unavoidable. The general
approach to the multiple site correlation problem is to
sequence through the tracks of a given site and examine each
one of another site's tracks in order to determine which
track, if any, originates from the same object.
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Morefield's methodology [Ref. 25] is considered as
very representative of the case. The method is illustrated

































Figure IV-11. Morefield's Method.
According to this method, reports collected by each
individual sensor are correlated separately at the local
(radar) level. This correlation has two main tasks; (a) to
update existing tracks (report- to- track association), and
(b) to associate individual reports in order to initialize
tracks or isolate false alarms (report - to- report ) . A local
data set is formed, which includes all resolved track coming
from the individual radar reports. On a second phase, a
track- to- track correlation algorithm is implemented to inte-
grate tracks of the local data sets into a global data base.
11

This way, tracks of the same object held by more than one
radar are identified and a clear picture is offered to the
decision-maker. The same approach is taken by Bowman [Ref.
26] (he uses a maximum likelihood approach) . In this later
work, the issue is extended to include different generic
types of sensors.
During the first correlation phase the polar coordi-
nate system is used. Before entering the second phase (track
to-track) positional data has to be converted to the global
cartesian coordinate system.
The usual approach taken in most of the correlation
algorithms is carried out in terms of "passes" based on a
"most likelihood" scheme. Reports are associated with exist-
ing tracks according to the criteria of how well thev fit on
a straight line (heading) and on regular intervals (constant
velocity). Tracks of this family are called "well behaving".
Subsequent passes are treating the so called "less well be-
having" tracks in an increasing difficult sequence. Reports
which are correlated are removed from further consideration.
The remaining data is analyzed according to different cri-
teria, etc. This stepwise correlation methodology is dis-
cussed in more detail by Wiener [Ref. 27]. Figures IV-12,
IV-15 and IV-14 illustrate the stepwise correlation. This
method is utilized for the conceptual surveillance system





Fiaure IV-13. Well -Behaving
Tracks




3 . Report -to-Report Correlation
Correlation is performed by associating data reported
over a scan period with data reported during the same scan
period by another radar, or data reported by the same or
other radar on the previous scan period. It is used in two
cases .
The first is when there are two radars with overlap-
ping detection sectors and it is desired to determine for
each specific individual report if it comes from different
targets (each one detected by one of the radars). An assump-
tion which has to be made in order to implement this kind of
correlation algorithm is that the reports refer to the same
or almost the same time. The mathematical formulation of
the problem is expressed by the following equations:
z(l) = x(l) + v(l) [radar #1]
z(2) = x(2) + v(2) [radar #2]
where z(i) represents the position as reported by radar i,
x(i) is the actual target position,
and v(i) is the position report error of radar i.
If the reported positions z(i) belong to the same
target, their Pythagorean distance has to be less than, or
equal to the two radar's measurement error. Otherwise the
reports refer to different targets.
The second case, where report -to- report correlation
is used, appears while trying to find candidates for track
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initiation at the single radar level [Ref. 24]. The case is
briefly addressed here. In case there exists information on
the maximum, and minimum velocities of the observed target,
an annulus can be drawn which is centered on one of the two
subsequently reported positions. The inner diameter of the
annulus will be the minimum, and the outer diameter the max-
imum target velocity. These are multiplied by the elapsed
time between the two reports. Positional data are positively
associated if one of the positions falls inside the other's
annulus. When only a maximum velocity is known the annulus
becomes a circle. Finally, when neither the minimum nor the
maximum velocities are known, an "absolute maximum velocity"
replaces the second (Figure IV- 15).
R=\at1 -t4)
r=vj:vt t > sieed
Figure IV- 15. Heading Unknown
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In cases where the reports include heading informa-
tion as well the annulus becomes an annulus sector and the
circle becomes a circular sector respectively (Figure IV-16).
When the reports include extra discrete data, special
cases apply [Ref. 24].
(t,-U
Figure IV-16. Heading Known.
It is clear that track initiation ambiguities need
not be resolved based on only two consecutive reports. If
required, more reports should be considered. It must be
kept in mind that as the number of unresolved tracks and the
number of scans grows, the number of hypotheses to be con-





4 . Report- to-Track Correlation
This category of correlation processes is based on
the assumption that a file consisting of track records already
exists. Scan data coming from a sensor system is associated
with these existing tracks. This method is more suitable
for data partitioning. Each track consists of geolocation,
discrete, and fixed attributes.
The geolocation information has to include: (a)
positional history of the track, either over a fixed time-
span or expressed as a fixed number of consecutive position
reports, and (b) heading/velocity information.
The number of past positions kept in each track record
varies from application to application. Whenever a new set
of reports is injected into the system, the probability den-
sity for the position of each track is dead-reckoned to the
time of this report. This way, measures of report -to- track
correlation are developed (e.g. distance between the projected
track, and the observed report). The resulting measures of
correlation plus data on present reports are used to update
the tracks into the track file. If in the definition of
"data" one-point- tracks are accepted, then report-to-report
correlation can be viewed as a special case of report- to- track
.
Most of the special cases can be handled more effi-
ciently by using report- to- track correlation algorithms.
Some of these are track splitting, merging, deletion, missing
reports, and false alarm handling. Dense target, land proximity,
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and clutter environment situations are also better handled
in the report - to- track approach.
5 . Track- to-Track Correlation
This case can be considered as including the report-
to-report and the report -to- t rack (a report is a special
case of a track) correlation. The situations where its use
is needed are:
a. When there are two cooperating (neighboring
tracking) systems, each maintaining its own track file. In
this case the procedure followed can be analyzed into (1)
the correlation of tracks coming from both of these systems,
(2) the determination of the ones which are duplicates, and
(3) the creation of a global data base where each track is
referenced once.
b. When dealing with different generic classes of
sensors (e.g. radars, active sonars, ESM, hydrophones, TR
detectors, etc.) In this case it is preferred to integrate
these classes of information, and create a more complete
track description scheme.
Since information on each one of the track files is
referred to different times a series of interpolations must
be performed for the data of both tracking systems. These
interpolations are followed by a series of point-to-point
associations. It is obvious that this category of algorithms
is more time consuming, but it is unique for the case of
neighboring surveillance systems. This method is used in
124

the Common Region Correlation modules of the radar module
complex in the multiprocessor nodes of the system.
C. TRACK IDENTIFICATION
As described in the previous chapter and in Appendix A,
a track record has a number of elements which are considered
as necessary for its association and/or display. A more
detailed description of the elements of the track record is
provided below.
1 . Track Record Format
The format of the track records as they are produced
by the Local Correlation module is as follows:
TRACK
(timel, time2, time3, x_coordl, Y_coordl, x_coord2
,
y_coord2,
x_coord3, y_coord5, heading, speed, size, track_no, id, type)





y coord are fractional numbers expressing the x,
y coordinates of the position in Km
heading is expressed in whole degrees,
speed is expressed in whole knots.
track-number is an integer with the first two digits
denoting the identity of the detecting radar (e.g.
01,02,...), and the remaining ones its sequence number
referring to the radar (when 60 is reached we start
assigning the emptied numbers from and on)
.
id is a three-digit integer whose last digit represents







type is a three-digit integer whose first two digits









08 : merchant ship
09-11 : unassigned
The last digit defines the specific type of the
vessel (e.g. 011 is aircraft carrier, etc.)
Note: Mechanisms for the determination of the three last
track attributes have not yet been incorporated.
2 . Track Number Allocation
Each track or unresolved report coming from a given
radar is assigned a track_number . This track number is
formed as described in the previous paragraphs. The alloca-
tion of the track numbers is done by each Local Correlation




Track numbers assigned to tracks or reports lying
outside the common regions of overlapping radars keep their
assigned track numbers. For the ones that are detected in-
side the common regions, permanent track numbers are assigned
by the common region correlation modules.
When a report, detected by two different radars, comes
to this module, it is assigned the track number given by the
local correlation module serving the radar that detected it
first
.
Subsequently, both of these track numbers are stored
into a so called Association Track buffer (AT) in the multi-
ple common region correlation module. This way, whenever
one of the Local Correlation modules sends the same record
(track or report) to this module, tedious correlations are
avoided. The track number passed to the shared memory of
the radar module complex is the one assigned by the initial
detector
.
D. TACTICAL SITUATION ASSESSMENT
As was previously mentioned, target classification is
very important in surveillance systems. Morefield, Bowman
and Murphy address the subject of tracking and recognition
concurrently [Refs. 28, 29]. Their correlation scheme con-
siders all sensor reports together to form the "best estimate"
of the "surveillance volume". The general algorithm can be
described as follows (see also Figure IV-17):
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1. Express the reports (from a variety of sensors) in
common terms.
2. Generate feasible correlation hypotheses.
3. Evaluate feasible correlation hypotheses.
The approaches of Smith/Winter [Ref. 30], Smith [Ref. 31],
and Witte/Lucas [Ref. 32] treat the subject from the pattern
recognition aspect. The latest approach (1) avoids maximum
likelihood decision techniques, (2) automatically identifies
areas of data inadequacy, and (3) permits the realization of
the full implication of ambiguous data.
Fortman, and Baron address the tracking problems encoun-
tered in using sonars [Ref. 33]. They discuss the limitations
of underwater surveillance imposed by both active and passive
sonars, by the environment and by the targets themselves.
Their correlation algorithm is a suboptimai one (they are
using an Extended Kalman Filter). Even if geolocation data
does not have high accuracy, doppler radar data has a unique
characteristic which indicates movement and gives a positive
classification clue. A more recent paper by Fortman, Bar
Shalom, and Scheffe [Ref. 54] introduces the Probabilistic
Data Association approach into sonar applications. Their
algorithm is also limited to passive sonars only.
Algorithms that more effectively handle the mult
i
-target/
multi-sensor case in cluttered environments have been created
by Reid and Goodman [Refs. 23, 55].
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A radically different approach is the one taken by
Friedlander, and Anton [Ref. 56]. Instead of treating the
basic detection and location estimation separately for each
target, a simultaneous estimation of multitarget locations
is made. The two key ideas used are: (1) the formulation
of the multitarget problem as a multichannel estimation one,
and (2) the representation of the multisensor data by the
parameters of a model which fits all the available data.





















Figure IV-17. Flowchart for Multi-target
Multisensor Correlation.
Papers which are more oriented to the ocean surveillance
target tracking are [Ref. 12] by Reid and [Ref. 58] by Atkin
son. The last deals with the problem of developing a quan-
titative and physically meaningful measure of association,
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by comparing the discrete attributes contained in the report
of a tracked target with the continuous ones. The final
association derives additional information by comparing
position/velocity and discrete characteristics or emissions.
E. THE HUMAN INTERFACE
The last and one of the most crucial functions of any
surveillance system is the alertment of the decision-maker ( s)
in order to initiate responses to developing threats. This
can be accomplished through a variety of man-machine inter-
face means
.
The way information is presented in this conceptual
model of the surveillance system is by means of video displays
on large screens and private (one man) consoles. Two kinds
of visual information is provided, graphic and alphanumeric.
The graphic information is categorized into land masses and
active tracks. Alphanumeric information is supplementary to
the graphical and gives descriptional information. There
exists an option to display the active tracks only (not land
masses) . This is chosen manually by the operator of each
individual display.
Land mass information is stored into a separate memory
attached to the display system complex. Each one of the
memory clusters is a block corresponding to a 10 X 10 sq.
miles area on the global tactical grid. Land information
occupies the first of the records in each block and track
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information follows. Since land occupied area does not change,
the address where the first track record is stored is fixed
in each one of the blocks. This way the "no land" option
of display can be chosen at any time.
The operator can select the dimensions of the area he
wants to have displayed. The minimum area that can be dis-
played is 10 X 10 sq. miles (the area covered by one memory
block). Next, he can increase the area by incrementing the
number of blocks by the square of the next one block incre-
ment (e.g. 10 X 10, 20 X 20, 30 X 30, ..., n*810 X n*10)
.
In Figure IV-18 the architecture of the Human Interface









Figure IV-18. Human Interface Module Complex
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The operation of the HIM is controlled by the Scheduler
of the multiprocessor node. Each time new target data is
transmitted through the bus (every scan period) it also goes
to the HIM. There the data is loaded into the display memory.
Just after data transfer is over the interface module takes
over and displays the data on the video consoles or screens.
Whenever the operator wishes to interact with the system
in order to switch to the "no-land" display mode or to request
additional information on a specific target, this interaction
also goes through the interface module.
For the console display the hardware/software arrangement
is similar to the one described by T. Boone in Reference 46.
1 . Hardware
The hardware necessary for the implementation of the
display is listed below:
a. SBC 310 Mathematical Processor
It is used to manipulate the data of the display
memory in order to convert it into a convenient form for
display.
b. AN/UYQ-10 Plasma Display Set
It consists of two alphanumeric and graphics
display terminals. The graphics display terminal allows
the operator to interact with the display system by touching
a point on its front screen surface. By touching the position
where a target is projected on the plasma display screen
infrared lightbeams which form a rectangular matrix near
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the surface of the screen are interrupted. The position of
the finger on the screen can be determined and hence a simple
human interface can be set up.
c. RG-512 Board Equipped Terminal
This system as both alphanumeric and graphic
capability. The terminal has a feature which permits selec-
tive erasure of vectors, points or characters.
2 . Process Organization
There is a family of processes which controls the
operation of the Human Interface Module. These processes
are listed in detail in Reference 46 and they generally per-
form the following functions:
a. Display targets on the AN/UYq-10 Plasma Display Panel.
Different symbols indicate the type (surface, air,
subsurface) and the classification (friendly, hostile,
unknown) of the targets.
b. Permit the user to interact with the system and change
the display menu.
All the software for the implementation of the above
HIM complex in PLI is included in Ref. 59.
F. COMPONENT FAILURE DIAGNOSIS AND SYSTEM REORGANIZATION
The multiprocessor node has several internal mechanisms
for the diagnosis of component failures. These mechanisms
initiate procedures to reorganize the system. Finally, when
one of the failed components becomes operational again, some
recovery steps are taken. A description of some of these





In case the common bus of a multiprocessor node fails,
the secondary bus takes over. The failure is sensed by the
Scheduler module of the module complexes which is receiving
a synchronization signal from the control complex every l/10th
of a second (event count) . Immediately after detecting the
failure, all Scheduler Modules force the switch to the bus
to flip to the secondary bus and data flow continues as before
On the average the data lost is limited to the data
flowing on the bus on a 0.05 second time span. Depending on
what that information is, the loss may be serious or not.
The most serious loss of data occurs whenever data heading
for the channel interface unit is lost. On the other hand,
this is the most improbable case since the probability of
such a loss is 0.00055 (the information will be delayed by
5 minutes if it is for an update, or 6 seconds for initial
report)
.
The flipping of the bus switches of the module com-
plexes activates an audio announcing mechanism which alerts
the operator(s) to take corrective action and restore the
failed bus. After restoration the faulty bus, it will act
as a secondary one.
2 Sensor Failure
The failure of one of the sensors is, in most of the
cases, causing a gap in the surveillance net (unless the
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system provides for coverage of any point in the surveillance
area by multiple sensors)
.
The failure is sensed by the Radar Interface Module
(RIM) which sends a special message to the Scheduler through
the dedicated SBC of the Local Correlation Module. The
Scheduler, receiving such a failure announcement, suspends
the use of all Dual Region Correlation Modules (CRCM) where
data sensed by the failed sensor was being correlated with
others. Instead, the data coming from the other LCM of the
pair goes directly to the shared memory of the complex.
While the sensor is down, its dedicated SBC stays
idle. After sensor recovery, the SBC starts its operation
again attempting to initialize tracks since all the "old"
data has been lost.
5 . SBC Failures
a. Dedicated SBCs
Their failure is sensed by the Scheduler through
the event count mechanism and their task is switched to the
standby SBCs. The latter have to assume that no track infor-




Their failure does not cause any problem to the
operation of the node since any one of them can perform the
job. Only the data correlated during the present scan period
is lost. The onlv case in which such a failure may cause
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more serious problems is when a great proportion of the non-
dedicated SBCs fails and the remaining ones are not able to
take the processing load. The last case seems most unreal-
istic and it implies that many other failures have also
occurred to the system.
4 . Shared/Common Memory Failure
Two copies of the shared memory is kept on each module
complex. So, whenever a mechanical failure is detected in
one copy, the other copy is used instead. The same arrange-
ment is provided for the Local Memory Complex (two RAM units
are used)
.
G. OVERLOADS AND SYSTEM'S RESPONSE
Under the architecture of both the multiprocessor node
and the individual module complexes the cases where overloads
can occur are limited.
Data which has not been filtered is not allowed to flow
on the bus of the multiprocessor node. This reduces the
bus's load. Only prefiltered data and control messages flow.
These are unable to saturate it. The same can be said for
the buses of the individual module complexes.
Overloads can occur only at the Local Correlation Module's
level whenever the capacity of the dedicated SBCs is exceeded.
This can happen in cases where the number of the reports
arriving from the Radar Interface Module is greater than 40.
This means that in a certain radar's sector the density of
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targets has exceeded the preestablished 0.07 targets/sq . Km.
In such a case, the data associations which are to be per-
formed for both report-to-report and report -to- track correla-
tions demand more than 6 seconds processing time.
To cope with this overload case, a special relaxing
mechanism is provided, which is called to execute a process
similar to the one executed by the overloaded SBC. This
"relax" technique is described as follows:
1. Each circular radar sector is subdivided into four
equal sectors (the 4 principal quadrants) starting from
bearing 000.
2. A mechanism is introduced, which counts the incoming
reports into the internal buffer "X". The mechanism counts
the total number of reports plus the number of reports on
each one of the 4 quadrants.
5. If the number of reports in "X" exceeds 40, then,
starting from quadrant "A" (000-090), the number of reports
in "A" is subtracted from the total number of reports in "X".
If the result is a number (of reports) less than or equal
to 40, the reports lying within the limits of "A" are trans-
ferred to a standby process served by an extra processor.
4. If the subtraction of the reports in "A" is not enough
for the overloaded sector processor to be relaxed, the reports
quadrant "B" (next quadrant clockwise) are subtracted (only
two quadrants can be serviced by the standby process).
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Note: Subtraction always starts from the quadrant which has
the greatest number of reports.
5. At the same time, the records of the tracks, as well
as the unresolved reports (internal buffer "T") lying in
these pass-over quadrants, are also transferred to the standby
process
.
6. When the number of reports in "X" drops below 10,
then, if the sum of reports in the internal buffers "X" of
both the original sector process and the standby one, is less
than 40, the original process takes over again.
The above mechanism allows the Local Correlation Modules
to be executed within the 6 second time frame. Figure IV-19
illustrates the mechanism.










Figure IV-19. Relaxing Process Mechanism
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The described mechanism has the ability to increase the
sustainable target density up to 0.14 targets/sq . Km. No
other notable overload cases are believed to be possible at




V. PERFORMANCE PREDICTION AND EVALUATION
A. LINEAR PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN THE NODE
The architecture used in the individual nodes of the
proposed surveillance system offers a variety of advantages
in terms of response time and throughput. Most of the advan-
tages are a result of the proposed implementation of the
multicomputer system described in the previous chapters. On
the other hand, the system is untried and requires a complex
operating system to control its operation.
The introduction of multilevel busing (two levels) makes
the system similar to the C.mmp and Cm* [Ref. 40]. In these
systems the concept of multiple level of busing was first
introduced and offered a substantial decrease of the load
on these buses whenever the application allows concurrent
(and especially filtering) computations. This way, contention
for the use of the bus is reduced and bottlenecks become more
improbable
.
An analysis of the improvements in both the throughput
and the response time for this category of multicomputer
systems is provided in Ref. 41. In order to implement this
analysis technique to the proposed multicomputer schema at
the node level, it is assumed that 4 radars are contained in
the radar group controlled by the Radar module complex of
the multiprocessor node. These radars are numbered 1 to 4
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and the pairs 1-2, 2-3 and 1-4 have overlapping sectors. In
addition, radars 1, 2 and 5 have a triple common region of
sector overlapping.
Assuming that the complexity of computations is such that:
-Each Local Correlation Module (LCM) takes 5 seconds to
execute
,
-each Dual Common Region Correlation Module (CRCM) takes
5 seconds
-and the Triple CRCM takes 2.5 seconds.
If one SBC was available, then the total execution time
between the unloading of the SCAN REPORT BUFFERS and the com-
pletion of the correlation process would be 20.5 seconds
(sum of the above times) . This time should then be doubled
if a cross-correlation is required between data produced by
the radar group and another sensor type group (e.g. sonar).
By using the multicomputing scheme proposed in this
thesis, this time can be reduced to 5.5 seconds (for the
Radar module complex level). This reduction requires the
use of four SBCs . The time lines of module execution for
one and four SBCs respectively are shown in Figures V-l and
V-2 (PI, 2, 3, 4, 12, 14, 25, and 123 are correlation processes
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Figure V-2. Time-Line Analysis with Four SBCs
.
Note: For the proposed system, the execution of the processes
PI, P2
,
...does not take a fixed amount of time.
Irrespective of this, the time-line analysis of the
execution of the processes by the multicomputer sys-
tem looks similar.
The above figures illustrate the minimization of the
system's response time. To maximize the throughput, four
more SBCs have to be utilized in such a way that while the
four first ones are busy executing the LCMs , the remaining
are used for running the CRCMs for the data of the previous
correlation cycle of the system (radar scan periods). This
is illustrated in Figure V-3.
The above improvements can at the best increase the pro-
cessing power of the system linearly [Ref. 41]. By adding
more SBCs to the system (more than 8) no further improvement
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is achieved with the proposed set of processes (however more














































Figure V-3. Time-Line Analysis with Eight SBCs
.
These response and throughput values are theoretical
worst case estimates and are not confirmed by code execution.
Bus use, in order to transfer data, requires some more time
(in multicomputer systems) . The bus access time is at the
maximum approximately 51 of the execution time of each process
(15 cycles out of 270 CPU cycles) as in Ref. 49 is stated.
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This, for the 8 SBCs of the above example would saturate
the bus at the 40% level, which would not cause substantial
increase in the execution time of the processes.
The bus will become saturated when the number of SBCs
executing processes in which bus access is the main instruc-
tion type is increased to 20 (100% busy) . In the case of
the proposed surveillance system the correlation processes
altogether dedicate a total average of 10% of their execution
time to bus access. So, the number of SBCs in each one of
the module complexes of the multiprocessing node could be
as high as 80 before a bus saturation will occur.
The same theoretical approach can be taken for the esti-
mation of the number of module complexes that can be attached
to the multiprocessing node's bus. Here, each module complex
takes the place of a processor and acquires access to the
bus through a private bus switch. Assuming that S°s of the
traffic of the bus of the module complex is I/O to the module
complex, a maximum of 20 module complexes can be attached
to the multiprocessing node's bus.
The above estimates give a sense of the processing power
of the multicomputer systems with multilevel bus architectures
The difficulty faced with these systems today is that
they have not been widely implemented (even if the hardware
can be commercially found) and that the OS to orchestrate
their operation is highly complex.
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B. PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS BY ADDING A NODE TO THE NETWORK
By adding more nodes to the network in order to cover
the same maritime area, a different partitioning of the geo-
graphical area is required (smaller subareas) . This, on one
hand would simplify the calculations and reduce the response
time at the node level, but would have as a result an in-
creased number of inter-node transactions since the problem
of multinode coordination will become greater. This increased
number of transactions would cause greater communications
delays on the ring and would reduce the responsiveness of
the system as a whole.
The case where the addition of extra nodes to the network
can improve the performance of the system is when an extension
of the surveillance area limits is desired. Then a new sub-
area is added and an extra node is linked to the ring channel
(an increase of the length of the ring may be required too)
.
Such an expansion will provide the surveillance system with
an expanded surveillance area and the C3 functions will be
performed more extensively.
The hardware/software modifications which would be needed
for the existing multiprocessing nodes are minor and isolated
to the I/O modules which serve the ring interface unit. As
it can be seen, the ring network is easily expandable to
more nodes.
As an outline of the above discussion, the performance of
the system may increase or decrease with the addition of a
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new node to the ring. This depends on whether or not the
new node creates substantial traffic congestion on the ring.
If the ring is operating near capacity already, the addition
of a node may cause a bottleneck which decreases response
time on the ring. In most cases, however, the ring has
excess capacity and consequently the addition of a node is
easily accomplished and increases the overall performance of
the system.
C. COMPARISONS WITH EXISTING SYSTEMS
Most of the currently fixed surveillance systems are
based on centralized architecture concepts and suffer from
the disadvantages of that system category. On the other hand,
these systems are simpler in design and they do not require
complicated synchronization and coordination overhead as does
the distributed C5 system proposed in this thesis. A general
comparison of this system with the centralized systems follows.
1 . Failure Tolerance
The failure tolerance mechanisms for a centralized
system are simple to design and they assume a smooth system
operation. The weak point of such systems is the central
(or controlling) node which, if it fails, can cause the fail-
ure of the whole system.
As has been described in the previous chapters , in
the proposed system there is no controlling node with any
kind of a special structure. All nodes have the same processing
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power and can act as coordinating nodes or independently.
This way, the failure of the ring or of an individual node
will not interrupt the operation of all of the system.
At the multiprocessing node, the advantages offered
by the proposed multicomputing schema are such that the sys-
tem can withhold a great many hardware failures which would
be hard or even impossible for a traditional computing system
to cope with.
As a result of the above, the survivability of the
proposed distributed surveillance system is much superior
to the survivability of the centralized surveillance systems.
2 . System Expansion
Centralized systems are easy to expand if there is
excess capacity in I/O ports, memory and processing power.
If any of these three capabilities is at its limit, a new
system must be used.
The proposed system, on the other hand, is not
restricted by these capacity limits. Modular expansion at
the node level has theoretically no limit (by adding more
levels of busing) . Node expansion is easy and is done by
simply adding more nodes to the ring network (at the repeater/
amplifier points). However, this node expansion is somehow
restricted by the capacity of the fiber-optic ring. By in-
creasing the traffic on the ring, data transfer times become




3 . Programming Ease
Creating software for distributed systems, like the
one proposed in this thesis, is generally more complex and
time consuming than an equivalent program for a centralized
computer. Fault tolerance software is complex and requires
special programming skills. A larger proportion of the
programmers must be familiar with writing system's programs.
Systems synchronization primitives must be used throughout
the code. The real-time performance requirements imposed
for the proposed system add an extra level of difficulty and
limit the spectrum of the programming languages that can be
used
.
The centralized surveillance systems are better un-
derstood because of the longer experience with them. Although
the real-time synchronization problems can be more difficult
in a uniprocessor case, many years of experience with time-
sharing has helped to resolve these problems.
Overall, the uniprocessor centralized systems are




A. EXTENDABILITY OF PROCESSING POWER
Throughout the description of the design of the conceptual
model and its performance prediction and evaluation it has
been shown that the proposed surveillance system architecture
offers a granular expandability of processing power. Multi-
computer architecture and surveillance task partitioning are
two concepts which have contributed most to this expandability
1 . Multicomputing
The multicomputing schema of multi-level bussing that
was used, has given the system an almost unlimited expansion
capability. Even if the proposed system has two levels of
bussing, its further expansion into lower level buses can
be sustained in terms of bus capacity.
The nature of the problem has allowed this architec-
ture to be implemented. Almost all of the computations can
be performed in parallel. The limit where both the response
time and throughput parameters cannot be further improved
without changes in algorithms was estimated. These limits
are marked by the duration of the three phases of correlation
(Local data correlation, multi-sector region data correlation
and cross -correlation of data coming from different generic




A method to predict bus saturation conditions was
used, but actual calculation of the exact number of SBCs which
would lead the system into such a state was not done. This
requires precise timing of the execution of the software
modules at the experimental level. This task constitutes a
challenge for further work on the evaluation of the proposed
system.
2 . Area Partitioning
By partitioning the major surveillance area into four
geographical subareas , the processing power of the system was
increased substantially. This increase has given the proposed
system the capability to process almost 4 times as much data
as an equivalent centralized system during the same time
span.
The ring network architecture was shown that is able
to support this partitioning very efficiently and allows the








Figure VT-1. Conceptual Levels of Bussing.
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Overall, the fiber-optic ring network can be viewed
as a global bus which is in addition to the two levels of
parallel bussing at multiprocessor and module complex level
(as shown in Figure VI-1).
B. FAILURE TOLERANCE
The fault tolerance mechanisms of the proposed surveil-
lance system have been discussed at length in the various
chapters of this thesis. The main areas where special atten-
tion has been drawn are the possible major failures at the
node and at the network levels.
1 . Fault Tolerance at the Node Level
At the module complex level the addition of an extra
number of nondedicated SBCs ensures that a hardware failure
of an SBC will not create any gap in data processing and will
not slow down the operation of the complex. A combined hard-
ware/software fault tolerance mechanism permits a better
handling of the high target density situations at the indi-
vidual radar sectors. However, some further improvement of
the method towards flexibility is believed to be possible.
The existence of a second multiprocessor node parallel
bus (standby bus) allows the bus switching mechanisms of the
individual module complexes to switch to it whenever the main
bus experiences a failure.
Sensor failures are handled efficiently by eliminating
the execution of the Multiple Common Region Correlation
Modules which the failed sensor's sector covers.
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Finally, by duplicating both the Local and the module
complex Shared memory, the reliability of the system at the
node level is substantially increased and data losses become
improbable
.
2 . Fault Tolerance at the Network Level
A variety of failures can be sustained at the network
level of the distributed system. These start from physical
fiber-optic channel failures and go as far as Global Data
Base (GDB) failures.
The provision for a standby ring channel for the
network and the mechanisms used at the network ring interface
units of the nodes, assures an uninterrupted flow of data on
the network under the most probable failure conditions. The
probability of fiber-optic ring saturation is minimized with
the existing SLOW/FAST mechanism which reduces the traffic
on the channel.
The redundancy of the GDB is an extension of the
data storage backup concept adopted at the node level and
ensures data availability at any instant in time. Mechanisms
which are able to detect, cure, and recover from failures
in the system have also been presented.
Node failures are handled as gap filling cases, where
the adjacent nodes take over the control of the failed node's
sensors and weapons systems.
As a result of these mechanisms and built-in backups,
the fault tolerance of the system as a whole increases
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substantially. Further improvements can be made in the
recovery phase of each one of the failure cases.
C. MISCELLANEOUS
Node saturation, as a result of highly dense target en-
vironment in the geographic subarea it serves, is handled
through the OVERLOAD/RELAXED mechanism which takes advantage
of the existing alternative control lines for all the sensors
and weapons systems. The control of some predefined number
of the sensors is assumed by the adjacent nodes and the
overloaded node is relaxed. Recovery from the saturated
state needs to be elaborated in more depth.
The cost of the proposed system in comparison with the
existing ones is less in terms of hardware at both the network
and the node levels. In terms of software, the creation of
the necessary code would require a greater and more specialized
orogramming effort which makes the initial cost higher thanLOO O
for the existing systems. The advantage is that the predicted
software maintenance cost is low as a result of the modularity
of the design.
Physical security of information is provided through the
use of underwater fiber-optic channels (main and a standby)
which are very difficult to intercept without being detected.
The option that the person who is given the empire respon-
sibility for surveillance may be stationed at any one of the
subarea sites (nodes) , adds a lot of operational flexibility
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to the system. On the other hand, individual subarea Com-
mander's independence is fully supported by the selected
distribution schema.
The coding of the software processes of the radar module
complex was partially done and no coding for the cross-
correlation module complexes is included in this thesis.
This makes it impossible to accurately estimate the time
requirements for the completion of the whole data correlation
Only rough estimates have been given, which may substantially
differ from the actual times.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis can be characterized as a preliminary sur-
veillance system design. Most of the principal design
concepts have been discussed but many areas of the problem
have not been elaborated in depth.
For the potential implementors of the proposed system,
a great amount of work remains. The system is tailored to
be implemented in a coastal or archipelagic ocean area where
the various sensors and weapons systems can be installed on
coastal, and offshore island/islet sites or on the sea bed.
Power supply, maintenance, transportation, and communications
requirements (other than the ring network) are also areas of
concern
.
For the people who would like to continue this work, a
lot of coding remains to be done for both the correlation
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and cross -correlation modules, and the network communications
protocols. Testing of some parts of the proposed systems
can be done by the use of a small number of SBCs available
at most microcomputer laboratory installations.
The author of this thesis would greatly appreciate being
informed of any future work on the area by mail or by being
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